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19 NOVEMBER 1986

WEST EUROPE REPORT

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POLITICAL

GREECE

VOA NEGOTIATIONS: POINTS OF AGREEMENT, DISCORD

Athens ENA in Greek 2 Oct 86 pp 12-14

[Text] One week before the new, critical round of negotiations on the Voice of America [VOA] radio stations located in our country, ENA brings to light an important document which describes in detail the diverse positions and claims of the two sides concerning the new framework of the VOA stations' operation.

The old VOA agreement expired in 1977, but up to now the American stations continue to operate tacitly since the two parties have not yet reached an agreement, despite repeated rounds of negotiations.

The issue continues to be a great uncertainty in Greek-American relations. According to the document ENA is making public, the Americans are (invariably) advancing two claims which it considers interlinked:

1. The duration of the VOA agreement should be at least 25 years.
2. It should provide for modernization of the existing equipment by installing new, more powerful, high-frequency transmitters, satellite terminal stations, etc.

According to the document, the Greeks are at this moment negotiating on the basis of a "double defensive line."

First of all, it is not disposed to negotiate its position that the duration of the agreement must be at most 5 years and after its expiration should be renewed every year--a position which derives from the notion that "long-term agreements have a character of dependency." Thus:

The "first line of defense" of the Greeks also provides rejection of the second American proposal for modernizing the VOA installations and counter proposes: It is not necessary that this proposal be included as a condition in the agreement to be signed now. It could be the subject of future negotiations with a corresponding increase in what is given as compensation to Greek Radio-Television [ERT].

With this first line of defense the Greeks are seeking to safeguard a number of demands (they are included in Table 1 of the document which also gives the corresponding American reactions) which concern:

--Safeguarding our sovereign rights, the right, that is, of the Greek authorities to visit and inspect any time the VOA stations which at no time will the principle of "inviolability" be used; and the American obligation not to broadcast programs harmful to Greek interests.

--Safeguarding of mutuality, that is, of the possibility of having Voice of Greece programs effectively broadcast to the U.S. and that ERT should also be able to use the VOA facilities for broadcasts to the Greek area.

--The Americans to pay a one-time lump sum and other restitutions.

The "second line of defense:" The Greeks seem disposed to negotiate the American proposal for a "here and now" modernization of the VOA installations. However, it recognizes that even in such a case (for which Table II for additional compensation was prepared) the Greeks cannot accept the modernization's main point which deals with the installation of VOA ground satellite stations for direct (not through the Greek Telecommunications Organization [OTE]) radio programs from Washington which are relayed by American stations in Kavala and Rhodes.

The reasons the Greeks rejected this part of modernization are based on the arguments that with the installation of satellite stations:

--OTE's exclusive privilege will be violated.

--A bad precedent will be established so that others too (the Embassy of the Soviet Union, for example) could ask for similar treatment, thus creating in the country's wireless networks much more unpleasant situations than presently exist.

--Responsibility is assumed for their protection which will limit the use by Greek services of corresponding frequency zones, thus limiting development of the country's telecommunications.

Whichever of the two lines of defense prevails in the negotiations, which will start in Athens on 10 October, and despite existing difficulties, the fact is certain that as the Greeks have declared in the recent past the agreement for VOA falls within these bipartisan issues which will soon be erased from the list of "uncertain issues."

SCHEDULE 1

WHERE GREECE AND THE U.S. AGREE AND DISAGREE ON THE VOA ISSUE

GREEK CLAIMS

[American reactions between slant lines]

1. SAFEGUARDING GREEK SOVEREIGN RIGHTS

A. No implementation of the principle of inviolability as concerns areas of installations and activities.

/Indirectly - YES/

B. The right of Greek authorities to visit and inspect VOA stations at any time.

/YES/

C. Inherent right of the Greek government to take all proper counter measures for protection of Greek interests.

/YES/

D. American commitment not to broadcast VOA programs harmful to Greek interests.

/YES/

E. Informing the Greek authorities through transcripts or tapes the contents of programs already broadcast by VOA.

/YES/

F. Need for advance Greek government consent on any important expansion, change, etc., of VOA stations. Any such expansion or change will require, besides advance consent of the Greek government, the determination of any additional compensation the Greek government would be asking on behalf of ERT.

/YES, but the American side understands that the agreement will cover VOA installations as they will be after their modernization and not as they are today/

G. American responsibility to avoid VOA interference with radio, TV and telecommunication services within Greece or neighboring countries--and obligation to eliminate any such interference which may develop; also, payment of relevant restitution to the service experiencing such interference.

/American responsibility for no radio and TV interference within Greece is accepted as is also only the removal of any interference without restitution however/

H. Sovereignty of the Greek state over areas provided for VOA use as well as over infrastructure and other projects of common benefit built in such areas.

/Greek sovereignty is recognized only over the areas provided for use by VOA/

I. The possibility, after bilateral talks, of realizing projects of common benefit in areas assigned for VOA use.

/YES/

J. When the agreement expires and the VOA stations are removed, the equipment, materials and supplies will come into Greece's possession, for which compensation will be made.

/Greece will be asked for compensation for any type of transfer/

2. MUTUALITY

A. Principle of mutuality and assurance of an effective way of broadcasting Voice of Greece programs to the U.S. and use of the VOA facilities in Greece for ERT broadcasts to the Greek area.

/Two possibilities collectively used:

- Athens-Kavala shortwave broadcasts directly to listeners in North America
- Athens-Kavala-Greenville or Bethany or Delano shortwave relays to South America (a part of the U.S. will thus be covered)/

B. Customs, tariff duty exemption and privileges for Voice of Greece in the U.S. and for VOA in Greece.

/YES/

3. FINANCIAL RESTITUTION

A. A 6.2 million dollar lump sum as a write off of the U.S. financial obligations to Greece for the use of VOA stations until now.

/Offered 1,250,000 dollars/

B. A 1.5 million dollar lump sum as a supplement to technical equipment.

/Left unanswered/

4. HOURS OF TRANSMITTER USE

A. Exclusive use of one of the existing 250 KW shortwave transmitters in Kavala.

/YES/

B. Eleven and one half hours daily use of one 550 KW medium-wave transmitter in Kavala (80.5 hours weekly).

/Forty six hours weekly were proposed/

C. Six hours daily use of one 500 medium-wave transmitter in Rhodes (42 hours weekly).

/Twenty two hours weekly were proposed/

D. At least 6 hours daily use of VOA shortwave stations (in Greenville, North Carolina, Delano, California, and Bethany, Ohio) for Voice of Greece broadcasts.

/A maximum of 6 hour daily broadcasts from U.S. stations not specified in advance was proposed/

5. EQUIPMENT

A. Three equipped 250 KW shortwave transmitters in Avlida.

/One equipped 250 KW shortwave station in Avlida/

B. One 300 KW medium-wave transmitter at Ermoupolis, Crete with the system of its emissivity [sic].

C. One 300/250 KW medium-wave transmitter at Trikala with the system of its emissivity.

D. Two rows of curtain-type antennae in Kavala.

/YES/

E. Transfer of ownership of the three 50 KW medium-wave transmitters in Athens, Kerkyra and Zakynthos to Greece which is presently using them.

/YES/

6. GENERAL ISSUES

A. The U.S. is responsible for the administrative, operational, etc., expenses of the VOA stations in Greece even when they are being used by the Voice of Greece.

/YES/

B. The agreement abolishes all previous ones on this subject.

/YES/

C. Five-year duration of the agreement (adoption of the presumption the agreement will be continued after the initial 5-year period and for further annual extensions).

/Twenty-five year duration (with possibility of denouncing the agreement after an 18-month notice which can be served not earlier than 5 years after the signing of the agreement)/

SCHEDULE 2

THE "SECOND DEFENSIVE LINE OF THE GREEKS"

Points A, B and C [sic] of the claims in Schedule 1 (table of our claims for an agreement only for maintaining the operation of VOA stations as they are today) remain unalterable.

The claim in Point C of the first table remains as they are with the only exception that the Kavala shortwave transmitter for whose exclusive use we are asking (Point C, Schedule 1), must have a strength of 500 KW and not 250 MW. Its ownership should be transferred to Greece after 5 years.

Finally, as concerns Point D of Schedule 1, the following should be added to the claims about equipment:

- A. Two 500 KW shortwave transmitters with antennae for the Salonica area.
- B. One 1,000 KW medium-wave transmitter with antenna for the Athens area.
- C. Exclusive use of one 500 KW shortwave transmitter in Rhodes. Also, 5 years after signing of the agreement, ERT should be given ownership with the right to use the VOA antennae.
- D. Ownership of the 500 KW medium-wave transmitter in Rhodes will be in force 5 years after signing the agreement.
- E. One 300 KW medium-wave transmitter with antenna for the Athens area.
- F. Ownership of the 500 KW medium-wave transmitter in Kavala 5 years after signing the agreement.

G. Five years after signing the agreement (and as long as it is extended) VOA is obligated to use ERT personnel (for training reasons) for the maintenance and operation of its installations.

H. Ten years after signing the agreement and any extensions, ownership of all VOA installations will pass to ERT which will be obligated to relay VOA programs from these installations or part of them. This will be agreed upon between ERT and VOA when the corresponding rent to be paid to ERT will also be decided.

7520

CSO: 3521/20

POLITICAL

TURKEY

PROFILE OF 'NEW' ECEVIT

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 5 Sep 86 p 9

[Article by Cengiz Candar: "A Little Peron, a Little Qadhdhafi and Nasser: New Ecevit"]

[Text] For the first time in 7 years, since the by-elections in 1979, I have seen Bulent Ecevit on the hustings, at four outdoor rallies in Istanbul. The meetings in Bayrampasa, Karagumruk, Telsizler and Mevlanakapi were called coffees, but they were really rallies on a small scale.

Hurrying between the rallies at Telsizler and Mevlanakapi on the second night, we had a chance to look in on the SDPP [Social Democratic Populist Party] show of strength in Yildirim Mahallesi, the place where the coffee was held at which Ecevit had spoken 2 weeks earlier. What came to mind was the first Izmir trip when we covered SDPP General Chairman Erdal Inonu at Karaburun, Mordogan, Urla and Cesme. We believe we now have enough data to deal with the DLP [Democratic Left Party] phenomenon and the SDPP.

Most important, we realized that the DLP and the SDPP are two very different phenomena. And, for this reason, cannot be judged by the same criteria. To wit:

On both days, we kept asking Fusun Ozbilgen, who has been reporting domestic politics for a long time, whether there were any familiar faces from the old RPP among the people coming to Ecevit's meetings. On the first day at Bayrampasa, he said, "Only one person caught by eye," and the next day at Telsizler he said he saw "four or five." When, on the second day, we ran into DLP workers whom we had noticed the first day, we asked them "which pre-1980 RPP district organization" they had worked for. They answered, "We were not RPP members, but we have been Ecevit followers for years."

At a coffee where the SDPP Istanbul Provincial organization turned out in force, we could not take a step without bumping into a "familiar face" to shake hands with, from Hikmet Cetin and Suleyman Genc to Ali Dincer and Ahmet Isvan. We met "familiar faces" both of former RPP members and from left wing groups inside or outside the party.

The "organization" was there at the SDPP meeting. One of them said, "Let's hear our slogans," and the slogans participants shouted came by reflex. Once when the electricity went off in the neighborhood, someone shouted, "Darkness will overcome enlightenment" instead of "Enlightenment will overcome darkness," and even this mistake was taken up in chorus until someone else noticed and changed it. The role of the DLP, meanwhile, did not go beyond bringing Ecevit to the small rallies, the coffees, putting him up on a table, adjusting the microphone and turning him loose with the crowd. Ecevit one on one with the crowd. And in dialogue form.

The "cool" SDPP audiences we saw on Erdal Inonu's first Izmir tour and Ecevit's robust audiences had different "states of mind."

Moreover, the people who came to the SDPP show of strength in Yildirim Mahallesi -- if we may generalize -- and those who came to see Ecevit differed noticeably in structure as well as state of mind. Ecevit's enthusiastic audiences were almost all laborers and low-income people.

That is, one was all organization. The "organization" in the other served only to establish communication between the leader and the crowd. The leader, or Bulent Ecevit, had direct communication with the laborers and low-income crowd. The SDPP, however, established communication with the same crowds through its organizational units.

Aside from the basic differences, propaganda methods are quite different also. SDPP people refer to the Ozal administration's negative practices in general terms. When asked certain questions, Erdal Inonu would give answers like, "Vote for the SDPP, we will do the rest." Ecevit took up Ozal's economic practices, from the Poor Fund to Oymapinar Dam shares, one by one and explained them in pretty effective polemics.

In contrast, while one noticed that signatures were being collected for a general amnesty at the SDPP meeting and that slogans such as "Jobs, food, freedom" were shouted, in other words, that things had a much more political quality, Ecevit worked up the topic of democracy, starting from the 12 September military regime's "slaughter" of workers' rights. He gave the impression that he was not very interested in the SDPP's general political buzzwords. This must be indicative of the difference in the forces the two of them are based on, or want to be based on, and the fact that they have different aspirations.

The two sides have different approaches to the religious issue, also. The SDPP seems more worried about the "resurgence of fundamentalism," stressing secularism and approaching the development of religious trends in the manner we have grown used to from informed circles for the past quarter century. Ecevit, however, approaches religious trends by perceiving secularism as a mechanism serving to prohibit Alawi-Sunni discrimination. He sees no objection to inviting them to gather under the banner of the democratic left or social democracy, because, for Ecevit, who is distancing himself from the intellectuals, the religious segments of society are an inseparable part of the "people" whose fervor keeps him in the political arena.

It is doubtful whether full similarity exists in the economic programs of the two parties. The SDPP works themes conforming to the old RPP "etatist" doctrine, while the economic principles we heard expounded by DLP Istanbul candidate Murteza Celikel in Bayrampasa fell in line with the "self management" economic model.

As for the RPP heritage, Ecevit does not seem to mind a bit that the concrete RPP heritage in the organizational sense has gone to the SDPP and that most of the former RPP national deputies, etc. have gathered in the SDPP. What he defends as the last general chairman of the RPP and does not want to abandon to the SDPP is the moral heritage. He describes the RPP as "an organization born out of the war for independence" and accuses today's SDPP leaders on that point -- albeit in a roundabout way -- of not risking their heads to do anything during the 12 September period. He hammers on the theme that, therefore, that kind of leadership will not struggle for democracy and the SDPP cannot be the heir to the RPP.

After watching Ecevit at his rallies in four workers' quarters of Istanbul, we could not help but think how Turkey's Third-World similarities are as striking as its Western characteristics and of the impact of charismatic leadership in such a country. If Ecevit and his actions are to be likened to any one thing in particular, it would have to be the many similarities with the Peronist movement in Argentina. Also, in the area of our own professional experience, we feel that he parallels a Qadhdhafi-type leadership or what we might call a Nasser-type leadership. A populism diametrically opposed to any elitist manner.

With this many obvious differences, it is doubtful how much of an impact a campaign against Ecevit as a "divisive element" would have. It seems to us that he relishes this kind of attack anyway, because during this campaign he has stood before thousands of people and launched into fierce polemics to the applause of the people. He said plainly at Karagumruk that he would continue these polemics as long as the campaign lasted. We hear attributions such as, "It was noted that, in response to the reactions, he avoided lashing out at the SDPP this time," but, for this reason, do not consider them valid.

Like it or not, Ecevit has founded a brand new movement. I do not know about the "electorate," but the "people" are with him.

8349

CSO: 3554/21

POLITICAL

TURKEY

ECEVIT INTERVIEWED ON POLITICAL SYSTEM, OZAL POLICY

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 11-14 Jul 86

[Interview with Bulent Ecevit conducted by Rauf Tamer on 20 June 1986 at Ecevit's home; updated remarks by Ecevit provided on 12 July 1986]

(11 Jul 86 p 5)

[Excerpt] [Tamer background] In the period of political life leading to the 12 September intervention, the writer of these lines was one of the strongest critics of Ecevit--possibly the leading one.

Political life has taken a long vacation and as is known, a lot of water has flowed under the bridge since 12 September, every segment of society has learned the necessary lessons, and we have gained a good deal of necessary experience.

During the past 6 years, we refrained from using our pen against a number of people who might be our political opponents but who were also defenseless; furthermore, we also strove constantly for their curtailed political rights "in the name of democracy," irrespective of their right-or left-wing orientation.

That is one thing.

Our differences of political opinion with Ecevit is another.

Nevertheless, it seems to us that to have this interview with him, after so many years, is a journalistic duty, to say the least....

Moreover, one might say that it is a democratic duty as well, as it demonstrates how people who are thought to be past the stage of talking to one another can actually embark upon a civilized dialogue.

Now we will begin our questions and answers. Other than the personal remarks we will make at certain intervals, all the words and statements are those of the Honorable Mr Ecevit.

We publish these verbatim, reserving for him the right to make corrections.

20 June 1986.

Our appointment was at 1700 hours.

I rang the bell at 1700 sharp.

Bulent Ecevit opened the door. He must have been alone in this modest home.

[Tamer] Is Madam (Rahsan Ecevit) not at home?

[Ecevit] She just went to the party office. But she will try to be back before you leave.

[Tamer background] Kubilay Calikoglu quickly completes taking the photographs he came for and we see him off.

So, the two of us are alone in this apartment.

I recall those awe-inspiring meetings.... All those exuberant people filling the squares with excitement at the prospect of seeing Karaoglan (affectionate popular nickname for Ecevit).... The 3 June 1977 meeting in Istanbul in particular... And Ecevit, then defiant in the face of the information that there would be an assassination, exclaiming "My wife and I will be at Taksim Square!" is now sitting there, "just a simple citizen," facing me....

[12 Jul 86 p 5]

[Excerpt] [Tamer background] Ecevit considers that the post-1960 organization of the Turkish political parties was, in a geographical sense, too limited.

How did "this common negligence by both the military and the civilians" affect the country's political anatomy?

We thought it would be useful to raise this subject, even though it may not appears to be related to either continuous or intermittent interventions:

Bulent Ecevit says:

[Ecevit] Political parties must be able to get closely involved with social organizations and cooperate with society, as this is the way for parties to penetrate the outer reaches of society.

[Tamer] An example, please.

[Ecevit] Let us take a district the size of Bakirkoy or Cankaya, with a population of 500,000 or 1 million. Can a party administration of seven-nine persons feel the pulse of the population of a district this size, or pass on all the messages of the party to them? The parties are also prohibited by law from establishing ties with trade unions and other social organizations. Such restrictions detach the parties from society and deprive them of the capacity to fulfill their functions.

[Tamer] But when such ties are established, tremors ripple through society

[Ecevit] The tremors and incidents that have occurred were caused not by the parties but by organizations and illegal establishments outside the parties, and especially outside the area under the control of the major parties. The vacuum left by the parties in society and social organizations was filled by certain irresponsible organizations.

[Tamer] Nevertheless, the outlook that inhibits risking the kind of organic tie you mention is still here. There is a kind of timidity in society, too.

[Ecevit] Honorable Mr Tamer, one has to risk it. In my opinion, there are greater drawbacks in leaving the field clear for unofficial organizations.... In the pre-1960 era, there were guilds and communes. Fractions and terrorists could not enter such quarter. It was these that were sorely missed when the pre-1980 murders were committed. Just think of it: one lacks antennae and one lacks organic ties with the quarters and villages, yet one has to govern the country. That is the situation arising from the joint neglect by the military and the civilians. It is a climate of "who the hell do the people think they are!"

[Tamer] Can the people handle this organic tie smoothly?

[Ecevit] They can. There are Turkish peasants who have achieved full political rights in Scandinavia. They may perhaps find the social life not entirely to their liking--but never the political life.... Would there be rivers of blood if we had the same here? No.

[Tamer] That is what I am questioning.

[Ecevit] Last year, Rahsan [Mrs Ecevit] and I were invited to Denmark in connection with the local election campaign in which Turks were taking part both as candidates and voters. We went. We held many meetings. We went all over the place. There was one important point that attracted our attention: all the halls where the meetings were held were in elementary school premises.

[Tamer] Why was that?

[Ecevit] It transpired that the local chairmen or the majority of the administrators of the Social Democratic Party are teachers.

[Tamer] How about sour notes from opposing parties? like complaints that politics are being introduced into the schools?....

[Ecevit] None. Because, as all rules of democracy are observed in that political setup, everybody conforms to the rules.

[Tamer] Let us get back to our own setup. That is, for a comparison.

[Ecevit] Right. Our parties are unable to benefit even from experts. Except for the administration, our parties are prohibited from making use of the

services of a specialist staff, let alone have organic ties with popular organizations. This is because university teaching staff members may not carry out for parties. The majority of private firms, even though there are no legal constraints on them, also do not permit experts on their staff to engage in party work. How are parties going to prepare for power under these circumstances, and how are they going to come up with concrete solutions for problems?

[Tamer] It seems that you regard these as factors that will influence the effectiveness of democracy.

[Ecevit] Yes, it comes to the same thing.... A verdict of "there, they failed again".... And then, once again, come the importuning intellectuals and civilian elitists ready for surrender [to a military coup].

(13 Jul 86 p 5)

[Text] [Tamer background] I am trying to arrange these points in proper order in my mind.

Look how the links of the chain come together.

- First, the resignation from the post of leader of the Republican People's Party [RPP].
- The resolve to continue the struggle.
- The desire to share responsibility with old colleagues.
- But immediately afterward, damaged relations with old friends who, "wishing to form part of a party organization regardless of conditions, acquiesce to an umbrella organization."
- Differences over ideology and principles.
- Also, a parting of the ways with certain people "whose entire activity consist of factionalism."

As I repeat these aloud, Bulent Ecevit sums up:

[Ecevit] The Democratic Left Party (DLP) is a fresh start.

[Tamer] Yes... exactly the opposite of the Correct Way Party [CWP]

[Tamer background] The CWP, a mission.

The DLP, a fresh start. (In my definition), a fresh start, rid of its faults, stripped of its factions.

Speaking of differences, I sensed a difference in the style of the Ecevit couple....

I say that I sensed; I may have sensed incorrectly.

There cannot be a radical change in their world outlook, of course, but it seemed that the vibes were different from the vibes of the sharp-tempered days of the politics of yesteryear.

I recalled, for instance, a recent statement by Rahsan Hanim [formal, respectful reference to Mrs Rahsan Ecevit]. She said:

We do not classify people politically in accordance with what clothes they wear or how they wear their hair or beard, or what kind of music they listen to or even the kind of lifestyle they prefer. (24 December 1985)

In another speech, Rahsan Hanim stated:

Who gave you these incorrect ideas that devout, practicing believers cannot at the same time hold "democratic leftist views?" Who has been telling you such things? Let us not forget that we live in a Muslim country. (18 May 1986)

These ideas are the products of this household....

It is clear that this is the joint viewpoint of the Ecevits.

These are, however, words that will also be well received by voters that are not on the Left. These are not words that will put off the crowd on the Right but, rather, will soothe them.... If you ask me, all this constitutes [electoral] marketing aids that have lain neglected for some 20 years.

[Tamer] Sir, could it be that what I see now represents a more liberal Mr and Mrs Ecevit?... Or is it just me thinking so?

[Tamer background] I cannot say that the word "liberal" I used was a very good choice.... What I had in mind was a free, unrestrained style.

I am talking of an independent and nonaligned voice, with expert knowledge of Turkey and clear of "debts of blood-money." It is just that the word "liberal" slipped out of my mouth:

[Tamer] Am I perhaps facing a more liberal Ecevit?

Bulent Ecevit laughs:

[Ecevit] Honorable Mr Tamer, this is how we have always been.

[Tamer] But we never saw that side of you.

[Ecevit] No you could not, because the conditions then made it impossible for us to break out of the ring and reach these points.

[Tamer] I see.

[Tamer Background] I understand the meaning of "a fresh start" better now. Ever since the movement to form parties began [in the post 1980 military coup period], I have entertained a private suspicion.

There was a niggling thought at the back of my mind that Erdal Inonu did not so much rise to prominence as that he was hoisted there.

Who is Erdal Inonu?

Ismet Pasa's son.

Who is Bulent Ecevit? The new leader who defeated Ismet Pasa at the 1972 Congress of the RPP.

Who was Ismet Pasa?

A symbol held in high regard by the armed forces, especially by the military commanders who carried out the 12 September coup.... Could it not then be said that this was a great opportunity to take the old RPP community from Ecevit and hand it back to the Inonu family? After all... why not go for an ideal name like Inonu rather than for some wrong or dubious one....

You might say, "Yes, but he too was vetoed."

If we examine what happened stage by stage, and look for clues of a staff game, could we not ask if the "veto" was not a stratagem?"

I pose this question, even if it might seem absurd.

[Tamer] Honorable Mr Ecevit, could this operation have been organized by forces that might want to have a kind of revenge for the 1972 Congress?

[Tamer Background] Ecevit looks long and hard at the forest in the distance and remains silent.

Then he says:

[Ecevit] I have never considered such a thing.

[Tamer] Are you saying that such a thing never occurred to you?

[Ecevit] I did not consider it.

[Tamer] I am asking that you give it a try.

[Ecevit] Would you like to have another cup of tea?

[Tamer background] With the Honorable Mr Ecevit, we tried to talk not about the past but always about that which is new.

About today and tomorrow.

How does a leader who sets out not on a mission but for a fresh start see the 1990's?

What is his view of Turkey's place in the world?

[Tamer] What comment do you have about the overall foreign policy of the Turkish administration today?

[Ecevit] Trade is naturally important in overall foreign policy. It is natural to emphasize its importance and it is right to do so, but it is not the sole factor. Too much of it is harmful. When that happens, we do not become transformed into Westerners but into a country exploited by the West.

[Tamer background] Ecevit asks "Why do we keep silent in the face of repudiation of our state by the refusal of passports to our citizens from Hatay," and says that he is concerned over the Turkish policy concerning Greece.

He says:

[Ecevit] Basic issues have been taken off the agenda. Various concessions have been made. The Honorable Mr Ozal has maintained the same situation. You may have noticed that the expression "continental shelf" has gone out of use for the past 6 years.

[Tamer] But Ozal's style has been getting harsher.

[Ecevit] The problem is not one of style. There are times when one's style may be soft but carries weight and expresses determination. Conversely, there are times when the style may perhaps become harsher but the important thing is the contents....

[Tamer] Honorable Mr Ecevit, what do you think about the policy concerning Cyprus?

[Ecevit] I see no fault. Things are working properly as far as that goes. But there is an important matter I cannot stomach.

[Tamer] And what is that?

[Ecevit] We were very careful not to involve any of the politics of [Turkish] Cyprus with our own.... We behaved in this way for two important reasons. First, to emphasize the independence of the TFSC.... Second, in order not to spoil a system where democracy was working better than in Turkey.

[Tamer] Are you saying that this tradition has now been violated?

[Ecevit] Unfortunately, yes.... It was the Honorable Mr Ozal who spoiled this tradition. He established ties with the National Unity Party in Cyprus. And he began giving cash assistance.

[Tamer Background] On the day that this conversation with Ecevit took place, Prime Minister Ozal had not yet visited Cyprus.

By the date the present series of articles went to print, the prime minister had gone to Cyprus and returned.

This is, in fact, what did happen.

Therefore, in order to add immediacy to our series of articles, we asked Ecevit yesterday to provide us with his appraisal of this trip. We are offering this new appraisal as a separate boxed item in today's issue of this series of articles.

Doubts raised by "a shadow cast upon the independence" of [Turkish] Cyprus.

"Amazing" blows delivered to the democracy in [Turkish] Cyprus, "which is seen as working better than in our country."

In a nutshell, "a broken tradition", in Ecevit's words.

We thought all these were reasons "worth obtaining a special statement for" at a time when we are getting close to the 12th anniversary of the Peace Operation.

[Begin boxed item] An Appraisal of Ozal's Visit to Cyprus Ecevit gave the following appraisal in connection with Ozal's visit to Cyprus. We publish it in full.

I had stated that I saw an inclination in Prime Minister Ozal to intervene in the internal policies of the Turkish Cypriot community. Unfortunately, the Honorable Mr Ozal's visit confirmed this concern of mine. He wants to impose certain economic and social policies on the TRNC through moral pressure and even, by more than moral pressure, through the threat that "if you do not implement these, we will cut off aid." This, in truth, is not the way one may behave toward an independent country. Not only that, but the Northern Turkish Cypriot community has a democracy that functions very well and is much more real than in our own country. Not only may Ozal's pressure tactics raise doubts about the independence of the TRNC but they may also harm its democracy. The honorable Mr Ozal in fact sowed the seeds of a great political crisis in Cyprus before returning to Turkey.

Certain know it-all businessmen accompanying Ozal have been proposing government models of their own to Cyprus; they say democracy is a "luxury" for the Turkish Cypriots. One of these businessmen went even further, ridiculing the TRNC and the independence of the Turkish Cypriot community in a very unseemly manner by saying, "I shall proclaim a republic and form a government in a region with 150,000 people at Yesilkoy or Buyukada [districts in Istanbul province]. I read these words by a businessman in HURRIET on 5 July. This businessman seems so cut off from the world as to be incapable of realizing the repercussions that taking the independence of North Cyprus so lightly may create in the world.

The prime minister has in fact not given any signal in connection with his visit to Cyprus that any change is contemplated for the solution of the Cyprus problem or the method to be used for pursuing a solution to this problem in the international arena. Nevertheless, he used a very different and harsh style to create the impression that a new phase has been reached in the international arena. Having left this impression, he announced a government decision to hold by-elections in Turkey on the very day he returned to Ankara. In other words, while meddling on the one hand in the affairs of the Turkish Cypriot community and the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus, he raised the suspicion

on the other that he intends to use the Cyprus issue in our internal affairs, in the electoral campaign. I earnestly hope that this suspicion proves false.
[signed] B.E. [end boxed item]

[14 Jul 86]

[Text] [Tamer background]

It was necessary to discuss Ozal's performance.

Such a liberal system....

It has its critics and its admirers. There are also others who stay cool, saying, "Let us wait and see."

One wonders what Ecevit's thoughts are.

Through what spectacles does he view the transformation introduced by the Motherland Party [MP]?

Most importantly, what are his ideas, thoughts, opinions about Turgut Ozal himself.

What has he to say about Turgut Ozal's concept of democracy?

These are the points I set aside for the last of the present series of articles.

Time is getting on.

We agreed on 2 hours; it has already been over 3 hours. Hoping to make the last plane of the day to Istanbul, I attempt once again to organize my ideas while sipping yet another glass of tea....

I begin asking Bulent Ecevit questions concerning Prime Minister Ozal.

[Tamer] Honorable Mr Ecevit, what do you think of Ozal?

[Ecevit] He is undoubtedly a person with certain abilities and he follows a policy consistent with his own line; however, not only I am not convinced that he is using his abilities for the benefit of the country, but I also find his political line very dangerous both from a social and economic viewpoint and from the viewpoint of democracy. Nor does he have anything like a sense of "concept of state." He is attempting to run the country like a catch-as-catch-can commercial firm. Furthermore, he knows propaganda too well.

[Tamer] Too well?

[Ecevit] Yes. Here I underline the word "too well," because to know propaganda too well is not an advantage, but harmful.

[Tamer] All right. He has also implemented measures that have had a shock effect upon society. What do you think of them? Are there any that you would

approve of categorically? Are there any among them that would make you kick yourself, saying "I wish I had done that myself?" If so, then which are they? Can you enumerate them, offhand, one by one?"

After thinking for a bit, Ecevit says:

[Ecevit] Honorable Mr Tamer, every administration does things which--when taken in isolation from their political directions--would be considered "correct" by almost everybody. But the important thing is the general political direction.

[Tamer] How about naming a few examples of the ones that are "correct"?

[Ecevit] Well... take the campaign for the inoculation of children; it is impossible not to support it or not to approve of it.

[Tamer] Oh, no! Let us not reduce it to that point. Why don't we take, say, the tax rebate?...or the case of the value added tax?...or the foreign exchange legislation?...or the enforcement law...the contrition law...and so forth?

[Ecevit] I do not approve of them in their general direction. An arbitrary way of administering.... I am not a statist in the classical sense of the word, but the Honorable Mr Ozal is destroying the concept of state. The Funds are taking the public services out of the hands of the state. Furthermore, they are putting a large proportion of public expenditures outside the scope of any kind of democratic control. I am seriously concerned over all this. You mentioned the enforcement law. We were responsible for the first change, in the same direction, in the enforcement system during our period in power in 1978-1979. We submitted a law similar to the "contrition law" to the National Assembly during that period, but we came up against great resistance and failed to have it adopted by the Assembly.

[Tamer] I understand. Very well then, how do you see view the Honorable Mr Ozal's attitudes and behavior on the subject of democracy?

[Ecevit] I do not believe that the Honorable Mr Ozal understands or is committed to democracy in the Western sense. In any case, in a country like Turkey, the economic policy which the Honorable Mr Ozal leads and implements cannot possibly be reconciled with democracy. This is because it is a policy that can be implemented only through "depoliticizing" the segments of the working people by keeping them under pressure and neutralized.... But there is an important point.

[Tamer] And what is that?

[Ecevit] To say "I am the continuation of what went before" is wrong. By not saying so, Ozal has made a very intelligent move.

[Tamer] A very interesting viewpoint.

[Ecevit] Ozal has done the right thing.

[Tamer] In what way?

[Ecevit] Ozal has made a correct diagnosis of a tendency in the people. The Turkish people do want full and true democracy, but they have no desire at all for a return to the pre-12 September period.

[Tamer Background] As I listen to Ecevit, I go through the pages of the calendar in my head....

And I recall the style used by Ozal since 1983.

That is to say, ever since the beginning of the period of the formation of political parties.

Ozal, in fact, never said "I am the continuation of this or that party".... In addressing the broad masses where he sought votes, he confined himself to hinting that he was "nationalist and conservative," but he did not produce any proprietary sign "to show connections." He did not point to any such sign.... He was very meticulous in this respect.... He was meticulous to the point of "driving up the wall" those who wished to see, without fail, that particular proprietary sign in him.

We did not get down to discussing the finer points of this topic. But consider that "a country fed up with terrorism"....

The environment of 12 September--with the cause "still not officially signed and sealed."

Then, "intervention."

And a society that, despite the leaders it admired and the parties they had committed their emotions to, "warmly welcomed the intervention"...[that brought down these leaders and parties]. A referendum that received a 92-percent vote [in support of the course of the intervention].

The truth is that, whether we like it or not, the "act of 12 September" has taken place "already."

Applause for the act in question.... But still a "hankering for democracy."

In other words, bad impressions have been left behind.... But there is a past sweetheart one cannot renounce.

Ecevit appears to have accepted, at least as a "fact," that 12 September has cut off an era--as if with a knife--and left it behind. Even though he may not be able to stomach it.

We continue our conversation.

[Tamer] Honorable Mr Ecevit, to say "I am the continuation of what went before" is an incorrect strategy in your opinion. Is that right?

[Ecevit] It is. The Honorable Mr Ozal has shown great sagacity by not saying it.

[Tamer] You spoke of a diagnosis.

[Ecevit] Yes.... The Honorable Mr Ozal has made a correct diagnosis of the inclination of the people.... The Turkinsh people do want full and true democracy, but they have no desire at all for a return to the pre-12 September period.

....

[Ecevit] Naturally, if it ever became the lesser of two evils beyond a certain point, then that would be even worse [sentence as published].

[Tamer] Thank you, Honorable Mr Ecevit.

[Tamer background] As you have seen, we tried to have not a single word looking backward. Had that been our intention, this interview would have been nothing more than an exercise in scratching wounds.

If you like, let us list, immediately, the sharp questions that present themselves:

- An interpretation of his famous speech concerning land and water.
- The essence and aim of the call to the workers: wrest as much as you can.
- The multifarious catchphrases of the 1970's, from the expression "counter-guerrilla" to "find your own foreign exchange yourself," from the "village-town" to "the people's sector," from "a parliament 10 years behind society" to "esgudum"....
- Even if you do not remember these, there is always the appeal--3 days before 12 September--for "those in the bleachers to invade the pitch..." and so forth...

We asked none of these questions. We touched on none of these points. Had we done so, perhaps the Honorable Mr Ecevit also would have been relieved, and he might even have had the opportunity to provide a logical explanation for each one. But there would have been not only no profit in returning to those areas but, in my view, there would have been dangers, too.

So, I have no regret, thinking "I wish I had asked."

I hope you concur.

That page is closed.

"A fresh start," as the Honorable Mr Ecevit says, let us now look ahead.

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POLITICAL

TURKEY

POWER OF CABINET TO AUTHORIZE CROSS-BORDER RAIDS QUESTIONED

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 5 Sep 86 p 2

["Once in a While" column by Atila Sav: "The Boundary of Law Cannot Be Crossed"]

[Text] Article 92 of the Constitution vests the power "to authorize the dispatch of the Turkish Armed Forces to foreign countries except in circumstances mandated by international treaties to which Turkey is a signatory or by international rules of courtesy" in the TGNA [Turkish Grand National Assembly]. This power cannot be transferred.

This provision, which has the same scope in the 1982 Constitution as it did in the 1961 Constitution, specifies one of the functions of the legislative organ.

The second paragraph of the article specifies the exceptions to this provision. In certain emergency situations, that is "in times when an immediate decision is mandated, the President may authorize the use of the Turkish Armed Forces." This authority vested in the President can also not be transferred.

Sending armed forces overseas is a very serious move. From a standpoint of international law, vesting such authority solely and fully in the legislative organ has a special significance in view of the conflicts that may arise between the sovereignty rights of two nations in such situations. Consequently, the transfer of this right to any other organ of the government cannot be contemplated.

The Decree 259 with the Force of Law published in the Official Gazette on 14 August 1986 introduces changes in martial law and state of emergency legislation and organizes the use of the power "to plan and to execute limited-scope operations outside national borders using land, air and naval forces as needed for the purpose of capturing or neutralizing assailants, each time with the permission of the government through the General Staff Command, using the principle of hot pursuit which is considered legitimate by international law."

What is legislated by this decree is the dispatch of some or all of the armed forces to foreign lands. No matter what terminology is used or what

requisites are sought the ramifications are clear. A power which has been vested in the TGNA by Article 92 of the Constitution is taken away from the legislative organ and turned over to the executive organ.

The importance and value of the operation does not change this legal reality. Our approach is not political but constitutional. Statements have been issued to the effect that the government has issued this decree with the force of law on the basis of articles 121 and 122 of the Constitution. However, according to these articles, the government has no such authority. Since the powers of the TGNA cannot be transferred by any "laws," they cannot be transferred by decrees with the force of law.

Article 121 of the Constitution gives the Council of Ministers the right to issue decrees with the force of law after meeting with the President on "situations mandated by a state of emergency." Article 122 gives the same right in "situations mandated by martial law."

Thus articles 121 and 122 of the Constitution specify the scope and the mode of the power to issue decrees with the force of law within the framework of states of emergency and martial law. These provisions are as follows:

The Council of Ministers shall have the power to issue decrees with the force of law after meeting with the President in situations:

- a) mandated by the state of emergency in times when a state of emergency exists; and
- b) by martial law at times when martial law is in effect.

The same articles also define what these situations are. These situations are those described in the second paragraph of Article 121 and the fifth paragraph of Article 122. These provisions specify "how government operations will be run, how the citizens' relations with the administrations will be affected, how liberties will be restricted (the Constitution says 'limited') or suspended and what obligations will be imposed on citizens in time of war or in situations which may lead to war." Thus, according to these articles of the Constitution, the Council of Ministers can use its power to issue decrees with the force of law for only these specified situations. Because only these issues can be governed by "law."

The situations and issues enumerated do not include the "power to use armed forces." As we stated above, since no law can be enacted with regard to the sending of armed forces overseas, the transfer of this power to the Council of Ministers cannot be contemplated.

Articles 87 and 91 of the Constitution specify the circumstances under which the "power to legislate" can be transferred to the executive organ as the right to issue decrees with the force of law. The transfer of this power--that is the power and the function of the legislative organ--outside the specified circumstances cannot be contemplated.

One of the most important functions of the government is to counteract those who breach laws and the constitutional order. It is appropriate for the government to use all the means at its disposal to perform this function. However, a "constitutional government" is a government whose powers and functions are specified and limited by law. The importance and loftiness of an objective cannot justify the crossing of the boundary of the law. When the said decree with the force of law is carefully examined, it is seen that the Council of Ministers decided to issue the decree in a meeting on 25 July 1986. However, it waited until the operation to proclaim the decree, and the decree was published in a special edition of the Official Gazette on 14 August 1986.

The constitutional organs have the primary responsibility to uphold the Constitution. The mode of operation and the action of the Council of Ministers must be criticized from this standpoint.

9588

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SOCIAL

GREECE

RESEARCH ON ATHENS YOUTH: BLEAK PROSPECTS

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 28-29 Sep 86 pp 6, 14

[Results of research by a group consisting of Loukas Kyriakopoulos, Spyr. Amourgis, Dimosthenis Agrafiotis and Lyda Modiano-Leon, who also wrote the report]

[Text] Greece in the year 2000 will depend on the young of today, who are still in school, serve in the Army, or have just started their professional careers.

The superficial public dialogue and petty politics dealing with daily issues and the every-day trivia cannot serve as models of inspiration. The fatalistic attitude toward the challenges of the future is a cause of pessimism and disappointment.

Participation of the young in government and in its responsibilities means they must claim their rights from an ineffective past and understand their responsibility and their obligations for a difficult future. It is true they need to make great leaps forward.

It is necessary to free the nation's creative powers in an open free society, in a competitive economy with just distinctions and rewards. It is necessary to promote the institutions which assure that freedom does not mean license, that personal freedom can exist only in a free, well-governed state. It is necessary to have the kind of education which provides knowledge and opportunities to all. It is necessary to have security which enables a country to be strong because it relies on its own capabilities.

Greece in the year 2000 should be going through the process of modernization today. Modernization calls for new production relationships which serve production; for new forms of participation which serve a just distribution; and certainly for new dreams. Modernization requires discussing and deciding today the country's basic orientations, with consistency. These are the basic national choices!

Introduction

The population of Athens was 1 million before the war and 2 million in 1965. This means that one-third of all Athenians over 20 years of age and two-thirds of those over 50 have come to Athens from other parts of Greece. Recent studies calculate that two-thirds of Athenian families own or use a paternal house in their place of origin.

The problem of Athens, then, could be of interest to us but could not be exciting. It could be a purely technical problem with an easy or difficult solution. But the significance of the capital (35 percent of the country's population, 40 percent of the GNP, etc.) is dominant in the country.

If Athens turns "belly up" it is almost certain it will take the entire country with it. There is a theory which holds that this overwhelming preponderance of the capital over the rest of the country's cities is a characteristic feature of underdevelopment and parasitism.

Today we note another downturn into development of Athens; a downturn which could be a desirable goal only to the degree a) it is accompanied by a population increase and the economic upsurge of the provinces, and b) the activities of the capital are oriented toward high-quality services. Unfortunately, this is not the case. The problem "Athens" therefore remains, getting worse, and whether we care or get excited today we are bound to be touched by it one day.

In previous articles we presented "technical" and to some extent "political" aspects of the problem. We believe the "spatial" view of a city and the study of its problems on the basis of a sociological interpretation are different ways to seek answers to the same question: The possibilities for developing and improving the quality of life in a given city.

Quality of Life: The Theoretical Model

Even though the term "quality of life" and the specific goal "improving the quality of life in Athens" appear to be clear and indisputable, it is difficult to give an objective interpretation or to give them specificity. As Marc Schneider writes in his book (*The Quality of Life in Major American Cities: Objective and Subjective Social Indices*, 1975), every person gives a personal meaning to what he considers a "good life" in a city. Quite often stereotyped or seemingly subjective opinions of the term quality of life do not jive with the subjective view of each inhabitant.

Therefore, the effort of the scientists is centered on identifying the parameters defining the quality of life in a city. In most cases they end up basing their interpretation on negative notions or on conditions to be avoided such as poverty, crime, pollution, etc.

In an article (HARPERS, January 1975, pp 67-71), Arthur Lewis tried to identify the "worst American city" by taking 24 "quality factors" and calculating the averages. Such factors included crime statistics, parking spaces, educational opportunities, etc.

A similar study published in the ECONOMIST on 24 December 1983 (pp 51-58), using a statistical method, identified "the best country one could live in." In detail, the respondents to the questionnaire identified the country they preferred by checking the following set of factors:

A. Economic Indices (unemployment rates, GNP, numbers of automobiles, telephones per 1,000 inhabitants, etc.).

B. Social Indices (primary and secondary students as a percentage of the population, population density per square mile, percentage of the country's population living in the four major cities, suicide rate, etc.).

C. Cultural Indices (number of TV sets per 1,000 inhabitants, number of Nobel Prize winners per 10 million of the country's population, etc.).

D. Health Indices (child mortality rate, number of doctors for every 1,000 inhabitants, etc.).

E. Climate Indices (medium monthly temperature, hours of sun light, etc.).

Both studies support the view that dimensions of the quality of life are very complex and interdependent. Therefore, the quality of life in a city or a country does not depend only on the structural or technical environment, but also on the human environment. This means that in an effort to interpret the quality of life and examine the possibilities for improving such quality in Athens, interest must be centered on the choices offered an Athenian--whether in social or cultural matters or on matters relating to the economic and technical structure of life in the city.

But even the definition of the term or the knowledge of ways to improve the quality of life in Athens is only a first step. The next and possibly more difficult stage is the study of socio-economic characteristics which prevail in a city. Also, to what extent these characteristics are absorbed by the political leadership and incorporated in their administration and political choices. Finally, to see how these characteristics tie to, or strengthen the quality of life in a city through these political choices. The model of political systems presented by David Easton (see Diagram 1) in which he describes various political, economic, and social elements and the relationships which define them, portrays in a codified form the study we mentioned above.

With the word "environment" (in its broader sense) we express social, economic, and cultural elements which characterize a community, a city, a state. These elements, or the so-called environment, provide the "signals" which

affect the choices of the decision makers (local authorities, government, etc.).

In other words, these decision makers, after relevant "procedures of processing" these elements or signals they receive from the environment, decide on a certain "policy", which will be implemented. The "effect" of this policy will have its impact on the environment followed by a feedback which will renovate and adjust the entire system.

Elements Which Characterize the Environment in Athens

By using this model we first examine the basic elements which form and characterize the environment in Athens. We refer to the processing proceeding and then we accept and examine the policy which is or is not implemented.

To begin with, the socio-economic characteristics which today describe Athens were formed only in the last 30 years. Therefore, changes in the requirements of the inhabitants and the needs the city must meet have not yet settled.

The rapid population increase, the different mixture of the inhabitants who come from the provinces, increasing housing needs, and the rise in the number of vehicles are all relatively new elements in the life of Athens (see "Family and Child in Athens," L. Movsourou, ESTIA 1985).

Therefore, a general observation relating to Athens is this transitional stage the city goes through and which it has to adjust to find its balance and "personality". The way we talk about the personality of a person, we can also speak about the personality of a city. Just as the sense of "beauty"--as it reflects in dress and behavior of a person--forms a dimension of his personality, in the same way the aesthetics of space, or the "pulse" of everyday life of the city's inhabitants characterize its personality.

Thus, we have "dynamic" cities, "neglected" cities, "modern" cities, etc. How can we characterize Athens? What kind of personality does it have? To what extent is a sense of beauty developed among its inhabitants? And to what extent have we developed a feeling of space?

Our purpose here is not to analyze all parameters and elements which form the environment and life in Athens. We shall rather limit ourselves to identification of certain negative elements which significantly prevail and prevent improvement of the quality of life in the city.

The first element refers to the relation of the city to its new inhabitants. More specifically, we focus here on the inability of the Greek capital to offer opportunities to its new inhabitants to develop and cultivate their special dynamism. Or if the phrase was turned around, we would have said that Athens does not take advantage of the strongest element for its development, nor does it invest as much as it should in something which will determine its future--its youth.

TABLE 1

How Important in Your Life Today Do You Consider the Following?

N=356 Boys

N=320 Girls

15 - 19	Very Important		Important		Unimportant		Total	
	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys
Friendship	76.8	63.2	21.7	35.7	1.5	1.1	100.0	100.0
Money	22.0	26.1	61.2	63.5	16.8	10.4	100.0	100.0
Steady, sentimental bond	31.1	20.2	52.7	59.3	16.2	20.5	100.0	100.0
Professional career	76.5	70.5	21.7	27.3	1.8	2.2	100.0	100.0
Studies	60.1	51.7	32.3	38.8	7.6	9.5	100.0	100.0
Politics (or social activities)	13.5	10.1	63.6	44.7	22.9	45.2	100.0	100.0
Have a family	25.9	24.2	45.4	52.8	28.7	23.0	100.0	100.0
Free time and hobbies	27.4	26.4	65.3	67.1	7.3	6.5	100.0	100.0
Social relations	40.9	30.7	56.1	62.6	3.0	6.7	100.0	100.0
Religion	11.6	9.8	50.0	48.6	38.4	41.6	100.0	100.0

TABLE 1A

How Important in Your Life Today Do You Consider the Following?

N=117 Boys

N=144 Girls

20 - 24	Very Important		Important		Unimportant		Total	
	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls
Friendship	64.6	70.0	31.9	29.1	3.5	0.9	100.0	100.0
Money	27.8	23.1	61.8	64.1	10.4	12.8	100.0	100.0
Steady, sentimental bond	55.5	31.6	38.2	53.0	6.3	15.4	100.0	100.0
Professional career	66.0	68.3	29.2	27.4	4.8	4.3	100.0	100.0
Politics (or social activities)	17.4	12.0	66.0	57.3	16.6	30.7	100.0	100.0
Have a family	37.5	30.8	46.5	36.7	16.0	32.5	100.0	100.0
Free time and hobbies	30.6	23.1	63.2	68.4	6.2	8.5	100.0	100.0
Social relations	38.9	27.4	58.3	65.8	2.8	6.8	100.0	100.0
Religion	12.5	4.3	32.6	34.2	54.9	61.5	100.0	100.0

The qualities and qualifications of the young are evident and well known. The young are better equipped to meet the challenges of the future because they have more up-to-date knowledge and livelier imaginations. Because of their age they have greater stamina for work, a stronger desire to create, and greater ambitions. Youth are the force of the future.

But the data contained in a study on the young published recently by the National Center for Social Research [EKKE] in cooperation with the Under Ministry of Youth (see SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Issue 57, 1985) show that although young people in Athens have all these qualities they find it difficult to find ways to develop them.

When the young respondents replied to questions referring to values of life, their replies support the view that they want to be educated, want progress and in general, express themselves in favor of "healthy" values. (See Table 1 and 1A.) However, when questioned about basic problems faced by their generation, one can clearly see the weaknesses of the city's infrastructure and "dead ends" they face when they "go out" into the world.

Thus, as shown by Table 2, unemployment, bad education, and the lack of city infrastructure for various activities of the young are considered to be the most serious problems.

TABLE 2

What Problems of Your Generation Do You Believe Remain Unsolved?

	15 - 19		20 - 24	
	N=356 Boys	N=328 Girls	N=117 Boys	N=144 Girls
Unemployment/Economic Problem	49.7	40.2	59.8	66.0
Generation gap	11.5	24.1	2.6	9.7
Education, study improvement	14.9	15.2	14.5	9.7
Amusement, recreation	7.0	5.2	1.7	—
Narcotics	3.9	5.8	2.6	6.3
Others	11.4	6.6	17.3	6.3
No answer	1.6	2.9	1.5	2.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

A corresponding study carried out in 1983 by EEC on youth of the 10 member-countries is also noteworthy: Among the subjects the young consider more important and more hopeful for the future are development and improvement of the living standard (related to material parameters), the quality of life, and development of science and technology (see "The New European," an EEC publication, Dec 82, p 60).

The same study contains another element: The special desire expressed by young Greeks to work for the government, coupled with the phenomenon of delay in starting their careers until age 25. This may be explained as another logical reaction to the limited choices offered by Athens.

On the other hand, a career delay is interpreted by Professor Tsoukalas (see "Greece in Transition," Exandas, 1986) as a deliberate and planned wish of the family in order for the young to secure a socially more acceptable employment (usually a better occupation than that of the parents, such as a civil servant or an employee in the public sector) which gives prestige to the entire family.

On the one hand these data show the importance attached by the young to improvement of the quality of life in the city, and on the other, their chances to contribute to this improvement, but also the city's inability to take advantage of their contribution. Finally, we see their realistic reaction with the choice of a solution which is considered "better among the worst" (a position in the public sector), a phenomenon which serves as the carrier of other social problems which feed the already existing ones.

Active and Inactive Athens Population

A second element characterizing the environment in Athens, and which constitutes part of the "social problem" is the reduction of the population in the 40-45 age group and even more, the comparative decline of the population in Greece.

According to the 1981 census, the age distribution presents a problem in the 35-39 age group. It shows a 20 percent decline compared to the adjacent age groups. This evidently is due to the low birth rate between the years 1942-1946. This group, in the 40-45 age range, comprises the most dynamic persons in public life, business and intellectual life, where they hold leading positions in all these activities.

Compared to all OECD countries, the active population in Greece generally and in the capital area in particular appears to be extremely low. Table 3 speaks for itself.

But if the total active population in Greece is much lower in percentage points than that of other OECD countries, it is equally low or even lower in urbanized Athens. Thus, in 1983 the economically active population did not exceed 46.3 percent of the corresponding age groups, while for men it is 67.4 percent.

Employment

A third element is the extremely negative change in employment with an increase in office employment and a rapid decline in manual labor (see Table 4).

TABLE 3

Percentage of Active Population (1981)
(15 Years and Over)

Greece*	48 (46)**	68 (69)**	Portugal	71	89
Holland	58	78	Japan	72	89
Spain	60	86	Finland	73	77
Italy	60	81	Canada	73	87
Turkey***	64	82	Great Britain	74	89
Germany	65	81	United States	75	87
Australia	68	87	Norway	78	89
France	69	82	Sweden	83	85

Sources: OECD, Labour Force Statistics: 1970-82, Paris, 1984

* For 1983, Research on Labor Potential (Employment) of the National Statistical Service of Greece [ESYE], Athens 1984, gives corresponding percentages of 51.9 and 72.0.

** ESYE: Statistical Yearbook, 1983

*** 1980 data.

TABLE 4

Employed (Excluding Farming in Athens
by Ages and Profession

	A G E S		
	25 - 34	35 - 44	45 - 55
	%	%	%
Professionals, small businessmen	30.0	26.5	19.2
Office employees	17.8	12.4	11.2
Merchants, salesmen	11.7	13.1	13.5
Artisans, laborers	29.3	33.5	37.8
Working in services	38.8	9.7	12.3
Others (including directors, high officials in private business)	2.4	4.8	6.0

Source: Pandazidis, Kasimati, p 54

This trend would not have been a bad choice if it meant the new generation could obtain the necessary training to avoid the traditional industrial and building trades and turn to a technologically advanced economy which requires quality services. A similar trend is evident in Europe as well. The percentage of London Business School graduates going into industry for their first job fell from 49 percent in 1982 to 29 percent in 1985.

However, the educational level, lack of scientific research, and the technological inadequacy do not support the possibility of such a change. According to the KEPE study (Employment in Basic Sectors of the Greek Economy in 1987) in east central Greece and the islands, with Athens accounting for the major part, the rising occupations include:

- Office employees in the branches of textiles, shoe making, clothing, chemicals and in general, various industries.

- Washing, dry cleaning, and ironing in the corresponding industries.

- Doorkeepers, building managers, and cleaning personnel at a higher level.

- Accountants, specialized cost accountants, and comptrollers.

- Assistant accountants, bookkeeping personnel, and cashiers.

- Office employees, warehouse supervisors, weight checkers, telephone operators, and telegraph operators.

- Purchasing and sales supervisors.

- Officers of ships and aircraft and administrative personnel, especially in the Greek aircraft industry.

Among the occupations which remain stagnant are:

- Authors (publishing branch).

- Managerial executives of private and public enterprises and organizations.

- Potters, ceramic makers, wood and stone carvers, stone cutters, etc.

In other words, contrary to expectations, it is apparent that Athens is moving toward another model of distorted consumer behavior and by extension to another model of distorted development where increasingly lower-quality services and marginal facilities are offered.

More Flexible Working Hours

A fourth element which constitutes a form of social problem is the "absence of an enterprising spirit" in Athens. In spite of the country's EEC membership, no competitive abilities have emerged; no innovations are promoted; the search for distinction is not encouraged. As a result Athens finds it difficult to improve the quality of life for its inhabitants, and even worse, it cannot attract the higher level or more profitable forms of activity which are a prerequisite for its modernization.

Thus, while in other productive cities we observe a gradual transition from the secondary sector (industry) to the third and fourth level sector (technology and services) and daily improvement in living conditions for the inhabitants (less pollution, higher wages, more leisure time, etc.), in Athens we are still at the stage of searching for a favorable climate for developing the secondary sector.

As an illustration one may mention the freeing of the "working hour schedule" which is now cited as one of the causes contributing to the "absence of enterprising spirit" prevailing in Athens. This cause could be easily removed. A flexible working hours schedule for stores would serve consumers and the city by reducing commuting, easing traffic and even lowering costs through a more intensive use of installations.

As M. Papagiannakis said in his article of July 12, 1986: "The current working hours schedule (together with the five-day week as applied today when time off of employees means closing down services) leads mathematically to the emptying of our cities and especially of their historic centers for a considerable part of the week. This has incalculable economic, social and cultural consequences."

Cultural Events

The fifth element characterizing Athens and possibly the most widely understood social problem in the life of Athens is the absence of goals for a cultural policy. Athens, although it has a significant cultural history and great potential, is actually a culturally amorphous city.

Dim. Agrafiotis, professor of sociology at the Athens Medical Personnel School and a specialist in matters of cultural policy, presented in a study certain data referring to the low interest Athenians show in the available cultural activities, and to the extremely low level of these activities, as well as to the absence, in the last analysis, of a comprehensive and multi-sided cultural policy. By way of illustration we present here some of the data mentioned by Agrafiotis:

In Athens, 44 percent of the people never go to the movies, and 24 percent go less than once a month. The average circulation of all Athenian dailies is approximately 450,000 on week days and 350,000 on Sundays. The National Philharmonic Orchestra gives approximately 20 concerts annually with an average audience of 600, while the opera gives approximately 75 performances with an average audience of 550. Finally, 4 million copies of books are sold on the average every year.

These data are not mentioned to burden the conscience of Athenians...They prove more than anything else the inability of our city to offer a variety of options and also a high quality of cultural events being offered.

In his study Agrafiotis makes certain suggestions which could contribute to our improvement of the cultural life in Athens, such as:

1. The possibility of exhibits where art would be combined with commerce, i.e., combining business and pleasure. For example, exhibits of clothing, jewelry, or fashions mobilizing artists and businessmen with possible profit for all.
2. The development of new ways of co-existence with major stores giving space for exhibits.
3. Mobilization with the aid of a newspaper or a magazine and the Athens Municipality for promoting a cultural event on the subject of, say, the history of social struggles. Such an event could be repeated every year with the same subject.
4. Utilizing the phenomenon "Athens is an aggregate of provinces," with the organization of local dinners in neighborhoods and the preservation of traditional recipes, local costumes, dialects, and rituals.
5. Establishing an international prize to be given to rising--not established--forces such as a young person who has made a major contribution. Something of the sort would be designed to promote the discovery of unknown young people, and it could be applied in sectors which currently have no prizes. A prerequisite for all this would be a committee of judges with great prestige.
6. Offering honors and recognition to persons who have made a contribution to the city without necessarily being known politicians or public personalities. For example, a good merchant, a ship captain in Piraeus, a syndicalist--men who are "model citizens in the city."
7. Establishing local libraries showing books on a subject which is of interest to the neighborhood inhabitants.

These and other similar suggestions give an idea of the potential Athens has to truly become a "cultural capital of the world," a potential which now remains unrealized. Unfortunately, our city cannot satisfy the cultural needs of its inhabitants, let alone call itself a cultural capital.

Reference to the above data identifies the social problems which characterize life in Athens. These problems are being identified--at least they should be--by the decision makers who, after the appropriate processing, formulate their own policies.

Processing Procedures - Implementation

Two elements negatively affect the processing procedures of these data by the decision makers. The first refers to the relationship between the central government and the local self-government. It must be understood that

the city cannot solve its problems or improve the quality of life for its inhabitants unless management is in the hands of independent officials who are directly and exclusively concerned with the interests of the city. Therefore, it is necessary to transfer funds to the local self-government and also management of local affairs to the local authorities.

In other words, it is necessary to make clear that there is a difference between the policies of the state and those of the municipality. In local self-government, management must be in the hands of an independent agency (of private law) to assure its flexibility, without interference by the state, without the rules of state accounting--so that it can spend but also receive (grants, gifts, voluntary aid, etc.) without red tape and cumbersome procedures.

The second refers to insufficient participation by citizens in decision making on the problems of the city. It is necessary for Athenians to understand in time and to decide what kind of life they want to have in this city, and to make their choices the basis for regulatory intervention of the state.

Questions of city planning and other more general issues relating to Athens require 20 years or a generation and, therefore, exceed the term of one government or a mayor. To have consistency and prevent policy changes every 4 years the city residents must be informed and must make the decisions. Athens is every one's business.

In conclusion, we may say that the social problems which characterize the environment; the personality of Athens with the inadequacies of the processing procedures; decision making by the authorities; and the signals, do not lead to effective implementation and even less affect the direction and implementation of policy resulting in the improvement of life in Athens.

Therefore, it is necessary to decide on our basic choices and take advantage of our potential to turn our choices into reality.




Diagram 1

Key: 1. Environment; 2. Resupply; 3. Inducement; 4. Processing procedure; 5. Governing; 6. Impact; 7. Resupply; 8. Environment.

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SOCIAL

TURKEY

IRANIAN POLICIES SEEN PERILOUS TO TURKEY'S SECURITY

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 5 Sep 86 p 5

["Corner" column by Ergun Goze: "A Lesson from the 'Mullaharchy'"]

[Text] Today Iran appears to be under the rule of the mullahs. The term "mullah" means "knowledgeable." Turkish history bears testimony to the deeds of honorable and knowledgeable mullahs. Later on, this term was used to indicate falsification. This was primarily brought about by the Iranian mullahs who lavished on themselves titles unacceptable to our religion such as "Hojatollah" and "Ayatollah" and who began to compare themselves to the clergy class of Christianity.

However, the Iranian mullahs have recently taught us a lesson which may prove that we might not be justified to talk so derisively about them. You will remember that on the occasion of Mr Halefoglu's impending visit to Tehran I wrote that we should pursue a very careful policy with respect to Iran. I also said that for the moment the Iranians are "fooling" us because of their war with Iraq. In fact this is so obvious now that everyone can see it.

Indeed, it was reported that the Karbala-2 offensive launched by Iran against Iraq a few days ago was targeted against the region which was recently bombed by Turkish jet aircraft and that it thus provided substantial support to the Barzani forces that are fighting against the regime of Saddam Husayn. As is known, the separatist bandits in Turkey were supported by Barzani. In the aftermath of the Turkish air operation, Barzani was forced to end its support, and the separatist bandits were forced to seek refuge in Iran. Now, thanks to the Iranian offensive in this region, Barzani has been given breathing room and has the means to act against Turkey comfortably and to help the separatist bandits.

Thus if the report carried by IRNA is confirmed, the Turkish-Iraqi oil pipeline may also be imperiled. But even that is only a minor detail of the main issue. At this point Turkey must think well about the following question: What must, can or will its strategy be in the event of any changes in the regional balance of power?

It is evident that even the "mullaharchy" in Iran knows what it will do and how it will do it and seems to be determined to do it. So much that, after

giving Turkey a couple of tankers of oil and making some vague promises, the mullahs are not hesitant about launching a military operation which may imperil the security of Turkey's borders. What is at issue here is a geostrategic destiny. Turkey has many strong trump cards to play and is obligated to defend very large national interests.

Let us once again state this fantastic contradiction. Iran, which considered a simple pursuit operation undertaken by Turkey against separatist bandits as "interference in Iraq's internal affairs" and which tried to protest it, is openly and officially working to turn Iraq inside out and is even warning: "Let no one try to reconcile me with Iraq."

Can we say: Let us leave Iran and Iraq to do whatever they want?

Can such a diplomacy be contemplated?

Before one answers that question, one would better take a look at a report carried by the Anatolia Agency. According to a report by the London journal DEFENCE, COMMUNICATION AND SECURITY, "Iran is supporting separatists in Turkey. In fact, this has gone so far that Iran, an Islamic republic, is supporting the Armenian 'organization', ASALA, against Turkey."

Yes, but let us be fair: The "mullaharchy" is pursuing a more consistent, disciplined, persistent and ambitious policy than our own excellencies.

9588

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SOCIAL

TURKEY

CONTROVERSIAL RELIGIOUS TEACHER DENIED RELEASE

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 12 Sep 86 pp 19,16

[Report by Mehmet Ozakay]

[Text] Appearing before the Istanbul State Security Court yesterday with a clean shaven beard, slightly long hair and a mustache, "Adnan Hoca" was denied release from custody for a second time. The mothers of some of his disciples who came to observe the hearing said after the trial: "All of our children became enemies of Ataturk. They were pushed outside the society."

The trial of Adnan Oktar, who is charged with weakening national morale by engaging in religious propaganda and who may be sentenced to up to 15 years in prison if convicted, continued at the Istanbul State Security Court yesterday. Nazli Ilicak and Akin Kamacioglu did not show up at the trial. Criminal charges were brought against Adnan Oktar following a report published in the daily BULVAR entitled "Adnan Hoca and His Disciples Argue with Young Men. Why Did We Believe in Adnan Hoca?" It was determined that Adnan Oktar was not subjected to medical observation at the Court Medical Department despite a standing court decision. The presiding judge decided that the expert committee which will decide if an offense was committed in the said article be summoned to testify in court by the police. The court also decided that Adnan Hoca be sent to the Court Medical Department and be kept under medical observation since he is already under custody.

After the trial, four women who said that they are the mothers and relatives of Adnan Hoca's disciples stated that they would press their complaints to the end. Requesting anonymity, the four women charged that their children had become unrecognizable and added: "They all became enemies of Ataturk. They were pushed outside the society. Although we are their mothers they do not even shake our hands. They do not want to talk to us because we do not veil our faces. Our children have been ruined. We will work until the very end."

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SOCIAL

TURKEY

COLUMNIST URGES EFFORTS TO PRESERVE SECULARISM

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 28 Aug 86 p 10

["Ankara Notes" column by Mustafa Ekmekci: "The Death of Secularism"]

[Text] I am writing this in case the readers were wondering about the latest status of Ali Nesin and Sevan Bedros Nisanyan. On Tuesday, I received the following telegram from them:

"To: Mustafa Ekmekci, CUMHURIYET, Ankara.

"Thank you very much for your help. Hoping to see you soon. Sevan Nisanyan and Ali Nesin."

The telegram was sent from Isparta on Monday. They were still in their barracks. For their discharge, their legal defense counsel needed to go to the Ministry of National Defense on Tuesday, speak and argue with legal experts there and have a discharge order wired to the 58th Division in Isparta.

It is highly likely that by the time this article is published, Ali Nesin and Bedros will have left the barracks from which their friends were "discharged" a long time ago.

There are not many days when I feel happy for choosing the profession of writing and journalism. But seeing the happiness of other people makes me happy too. At times like that, when I think that I am accomplishing something and performing my journalistic duties I am pleased.

In this case, Ali Nesin and Sevan Bedros Nisanyan are only symbols. Many other persons encounter similar problems in their lives. Many of them probably go through their ordeals unknown to the press.

Events in civilian life are immediately reported in the press, but if the issue is related to the military it is hard even to approach it.

Once a retired major came to the offices of CUMHURIYET. He had been forced to retire. In that he was not alone. As he had explained in his petition to the Higher Military Administrative Court, 107 officers were retired from the 3d Army in 1985 because they were considered objectionable. According to what he

told me, most of these officers, whose ranks ranged from lieutenant to colonel, were not of retirement age. On the other hand, they could not be convicted of any offense. The retired major, D.D., insisted that he was unfairly treated and demanded the rescission of the decision made against him. His case was dismissed. As a last resort, the retired major, D.D., had come to the press. He had been reading CUMHURIYET for years. Was it not my duty to investigate his problems and even the problems of those who had not turned to us?

I asked him to send me a detailed account of his case. I agreed to investigate his case.

Haldun Ozen said:

"Do you know what one of my best childhood memories is?"

"What?"

"Listening to prayer calls in Turkish. I could never forget the call to prayer that began with 'God is great, God is great.'"

In our childhood we used to climb up the minarets and recite the call to prayer in Turkish. I wonder if the elderly made us recite the call because it was in Turkish. The muezzin [clergyman who calls Muslims to prayer] could read Turkish, but he was not fond of climbing up the minaret.

In 1950, the Democratic Party reintroduced the Arabic call to prayer. The Turkish call to prayer which Ataturk had recited for years became part of history thanks to the Democratic Party. Ataturkists never forgive the Democrats mainly for this reason. Secularism was trampled upon repeatedly during the tenure of the Democratic Party. They tolerated this in order to win votes. In fact, they instigated it. They thought that they could stay in power for many more years by exploiting religion. Like Ataturk, Ismet Pasa [Inonu] was extremely scrupulous and protective about the principle of secularism. If secularism was lost it was obvious where the nation would go.

When Celal Bayar's remains were taken from the mortuary in Istanbul to be put aboard a plane, former assembly deputies reportedly carried the casket with "tekbirs" [pronunciations that God is great]. It is said that Governor Nevzat Ayaz was forced to say: "Stop them. They are shouting unnecessarily." I witnessed a similar situation during the funeral of Field Marshal Fevzi Cakmak in Istanbul. The crowd marched voicing "tekbirs." Immediately I distanced myself away from the march. I watched it from a distance. Then I walked away.

Today, the main issue in Turkey over which a fight is necessary is religious exploitation. No amount of argumentation on this issue is excessive. Mustafa Kemal says in his handwritten memoirs:

"There are those who say that religious unity has a role in the building of a nation. But we see with our own eyes that the opposite is true in the case of the Turkish nation.

"The Turks were a great nation before they endorsed the Arabs' religion. The Turks' endorsement of this religion did not motivate the Arabs or the Persians or the Egyptians or others who share the same religion with the Turks to join the Turks to form a single nation. On the contrary, this religion weakened the national unity of the Turkish nation; it numbed the Turks' national feelings and fervor. This was a natural outcome. Because the purpose of the religion established by the Prophet Muhammad was the establishment of an extensive supranational Arabic identity. This Arabic ideal was expressed with the term 'community of same religion.' Those who endorsed Prophet Muhammad's religion were obligated to forget their selves and to dedicate their lives to the glorification of the word 'Allah' everywhere. Even so, however, they were supposed to worship and to appeal to God not in their native language but with the book God had sent to the Arab tribe. These worshippers would not know what they were saying to God unless they learned Arabic. Under those circumstances, the Turkish people were turned into senile simpletons reciting the Koran by heart even though they did not understand a word of it." ("Ataturkism," 1st volume, Ataturk's manuscripts, the General Staff Printing Office)

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SOCIAL

TURKEY

PROGRAM TO FURNISH MOSQUES IN EUROPE WITH 'EDUCATED CLERGY'

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 12 Sep 86 pp 3,11

[Report by Nilgun Tarkan]

[Text] Ankara---An intensive "campaign" has been launched to rid Turkish workers abroad from the influence of extreme rightist and religionist groups calling themselves "Suleymanists" and "National Viewpoint." It has been learned that an in-depth report on this issue has been submitted to the National Security Council [NSC].

The program of "appointing a highly-educated clergyman to every mosque in Europe," jointly administered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Religious Affairs Chairmanship, has been expanded. This work has been proceeding at the instructions and with the approval of the NSC.

It is reported that only about 100 of the approximately 1,000 mosques abroad are under the influence of "extremist elements." It is warned, however, that the peril must not be ignored. It has been learned that Ambassador Oktay Iscen, the Turkish envoy to the FRG, has requested the appointment of 190 well-educated Muslim clergymen to mosques in that country as soon as possible.

Religious Affairs Chairman Tayyar Altikulac said: "Dissonant voices will be silenced when we have an adequate number of clergymen."

Report to NSC

According to the data given to the NSC, until 1978 when well-educated clergymen were first dispatched to Europe, Turkish workers in Europe were subjected to the religious exploitation of the "Suleymanists" and the "National Viewpoint."

The program to send clergymen abroad began to be implemented in 1978, thanks to the efforts of the Religious Affairs Chairmanship and the financial support of worker organizations abroad, the Belgian local governments and the Secretariat General of the World Islamic Association.

Beginning in 1980, budget funds were used to hold competitive examinations among graduates of the Higher Islamic Institute and the School of Divinity and

to appoint the winners of the competition--selected by a commission made up of Foreign Ministry and Religious Affairs Chairmanship officials--as clergymen to Europe.

The "Suleymanists" and members of the "National Viewpoint," who divided up the mosques in Europe among themselves and who tried to indoctrinate the Turkish workers with their extremist views and to exploit religious education for their own ends by introducing Koranic courses, were forced to retreat after these appointments.

Work of Foundations and Associations

The religious foundations in Belgium and Holland were followed by "Turkish Islamic Associations for Religious Affairs" which were first established in Berlin and then in Koln in accordance with German laws.

These organizations, headed by "genuine men of religion" sent from Turkey are reported to be carrying out the following work:

- Procure scholarships for clergymen who want pursue academic studies and earn doctorates.

- Hold funeral services for Turkish workers who die abroad and pay for the repatriation of their remains to Turkey.

- Organize pilgrimage trips which until now were run by destructive and extremist religious organizations.

- Transfer the movable and immovable assets of religious foundations to the Religious Foundation in Turkey.

- Educate the children of Turkish workers within the framework of national education and religious courses.

- Have standardized sermons and orations sent from Turkey read in all mosques and places of worship simultaneously.

- Create auxiliary educational resources for the young. For example, in Koln an apprenticeship for 60 students and a seamstress course for girls are offered in an area adjacent to the mosque. In response to requests, typing and computer courses will be offered free of charge in the same location by the end of this month.

Meanwhile the Turkish ambassador to the FRG, Oktay Iscen, stated that 190 clergymen are needed to maintain authority in these mosques and to prevent the entry of members of extremist groups into new mosques and places of worship.

Religious Affairs Chairman Tayyar Altikulac whom we talked to with regard to this issue said that currently there are 431 clergymen abroad, that the problem will be largely resolved with the dispatch of 250 additional personnel and that at present "the situation is 80 to 90 percent under control."

SOCIAL

TURKEY

COLUMNIST URGES GOVERNMENT ROLE IN BUILDING MOSQUES

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 5 Sep 86 p 2

["Friday Chat" column by Hamdi Mert: "The Mosques Week"]

[Text] The Religious Affairs Chairmanship has proclaimed the first week of every October, beginning in 1986, as the "Mosques Week." During that week mosques will be discussed across Turkey; the mosques' structure, organization, surrounding landscape, architecture and services will be examined.

Memories

I remember the days when I was a student at the Adana Islamic Seminary. Our nation's desire and eagerness to build "mosques" is well known. At that time, mosques were being built everywhere. It is said that at certain ages a person thinks he is "somebody." We experienced that feeling at that time and we advised people to build seminaries rather than "mosques." After all, what purpose can mosques serve without imams [Muslim clergymen] and congregations? Are not seminaries institutions that train personnel for "mosques" like machines making machines? Moreover, seminaries also house "mosques." Thus, schools and not "mosques" should be built. That is what we used to say.

This suggestion, interpretation and approach was indeed correct. But later on, we learned another "truth." The institution of the mosque is truly very important. In 1976, we traveled to Bulgaria by land. We visited Turkish-populated regions in the Soviet Union in 1978 and in Greece in 1980. Turkish-populated regions in Western Thrace, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union have remained Turkish and Muslim only because of the existence of mosques. It is said that during the Lausanne Conference the Greek delegation insisted that Edirne belongs to Greece. The British delegation reportedly objected: "Let us assume that Edirne belongs to Greece. What are we going to do with the Selimiye Mosque?" The magnificent Selimiye Mosque thus saved Edirne without any need for objections and arguments by the Turkish delegation.

That is a fact. With their permanent and strong structures, mosques have, so to speak, acted as our title deeds and seals for the locations they stand on.

Race to Build Mosques

The first mosques "Mescid-i Kuba" and "Mescid-i Nebi" were built by the Prophet himself and his companions. Later, nations and individuals raced each

other to build and to restore mosques. The "state treasury" and the "religious foundations" worked hand in hand. A mosque architecture was developed with the sponsorship of the state.

The caliph sultans took a personal interest in mosque architecture. When the Ottoman Empire was established, "prayer" mosques were built for the sultans. Some "pashas" and "sultans' mothers" also joined this race. The mosques of Fatih, Beyazit, Suleymaniye, Selimiye and Sultanahmet are the fruits of this determination and endeavor.

It is said that the desire to draw the attention of the Islamic world to the center of the "caliphate" was the driving force behind this endeavor. It is a viewpoint. Perhaps it is only one of the motivating causes. However, the primary objective was undoubtedly the desire to display the "exaltation of the word of God" not only on battlefronts but in the country's architecture and to spread the Islamic faith and the Turkish-Islamic spirit by engraving it on earth and rocks.

It is this determination and endeavor that makes these lands "Turkish" and "Islamic"--an endeavor in which the state and the nation compete.

It is said that the Suleymaniye Mosque alone had 485 permanent staff members during the period when the brightest episodes of Turkish history were written. Of these, 297 reportedly provided "religious services."

One wonders what did 485 official personnel did in a single mosque.

Therefore this is the meaning contained in the "name" and "calling" of the institution of the "mosque." The mosque obviously does not mean just "call to prayer" and "prayer." It specially does not mean opening the mosque at "prayer" time and closing it afterwards.

What About Today?

During the last three-quarters of a century, mosques have been physically entrusted to individuals and congregations.

As the population grew, there was a need for new mosques. "Individuals" and "associations" built mosques with "four walls and a ceiling" to meet the needs of the day without being able to think about the past and the future. They built mosques with no character or style. They did that because that is all they could afford and also because of the intellectual drought of the last 1 and 1/2 centuries.

This is wrong. Because the "state" is permanent. The homeland's architecture must be commensurate with the permanence of the state, particularly since mosques are the permanent seals of Turkism and Islam on these lands.

Fahri Koruturk, Turkey's sixth president, visited the Religious Affairs Chairmanship in 1976. He watched the Kocatepe mosque from a distance. He must have liked it because he suggested that we should develop a "mosque architecture" as in our past history and said that this must be done by the "state" which must show the way to the people.

The current Chairman of Religious Affairs was then the deputy chairman of the said agency. Since then, much has been said about a "mosque architecture." The Religious Affairs Chairmanship and the Religious Foundation built projects like "villages," "neighborhoods" and "cities." The "Kocatepe Mosque" was cited as an example of cooperation between the state and the nation. However, this project could never be set on a serious disciplinary course.

Now, while the "Religious Foundations Directorate General" expands its budget for the building and repair of mosques, official allotments are made from the general budget for the construction of "mosques" and "model mosques."

This means that after a long interruption the "state" is once again resuming its role. Indeed, that is the right course.

If the state and the nation are integral, if the institution of the "mosque" has a positive function in our national life and in the continuity of the homeland as a Turkish and Islamic land, then collaboration between the state and the nation must continue on this issue.

From this standpoint, the "Mosques Week" is appropriate and meaningful.

9588

CSO: 3554/14

SOCIAL

TURKEY

BRIEFS

JOURNALIST ACCUSED OF ANTISECULARISM--A prison sentence of 7 and 1/2 years has been asked for journalist-author Sadik Albayrak who is being tried on charges of engaging in antiseccular propaganda in his book entitled "Walkers and Sufferers." At the trial held at the Istanbul State Security Court yesterday, the prosecutor said in his statement that the defendant insists in his book that the system of government in Turkey must be based on religious principles and that he describes the republican reforms as a "deluge." The trial was adjourned to a future date after Sadik Albayrak, a former writer in MILLI GAZETE, read his defense. [Text] [Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 5 Sep 86 p 3] 9588

ANTISECULARISM CHARGES DROPPED--Sevket Kazan, a former official of the now defunct National Salvation Party, who was tried on charges of making antiseccular statements in a speech in Stuttgart, FRG, has been acquitted. During his trial at the 1st Military Court of the IV Army Corps Command yesterday, defendant Sevket Kazan read his closing defense statement. Kazan said: "The military prosecutor is committed to defending the state. But protecting a statesman is also among his duties. I served as minister of justice and labor and as the deputy speaker of the Turkish Grand National Assembly on behalf of my party. During that time I was not charged with any criminal offenses. I reject the baseless imputation made against me in a country like the FRG where all fugitives from the law have congregated--I mean those who have defected from Turkey--and I ask for my acquittal." [Text] [Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 12 Sep 86 p 7] 9588

CSO: 3554/15

ECONOMIC

AUSTRIA

ANALYSIS OF TRADE WITH EAST BLOC COUNTRIES

AU081200 [Summary] Vienna DIE PRESSE Supplement in German on 8 September devotes 12 pages to Austrian cooperation with the CEMA countries on the occasion of the 10-14 September Vienna autumn fair. The reports include an analysis of Austrian trade with the East Bloc countries by Friedrich Gleissner (2,000 words), in which he presents the historical development of trade with the CEMA countries from 1955 onwards. He stresses that exports to the East Bloc in general are relatively stable, although there are some fluctuations in trade with the individual countries.

Gleissner gives tables providing the following information on Austrian exports and imports to and from the East Bloc countries in 1983-85:

AUSTRIAN IMPORTS (in 1,000 schillings)

Trading partner	1983	Percentage of total Austrian imports	Percentage change
Bulgaria	467,669	0.1	minus 18.5
CSSR	7,368,863	2.1	plus 1.2
GDR	2,726,299	0.8	minus 7.7
Mongolia	784	0.0	minus 14.0
Poland	3,561,564	1.0	plus 11.3
Romania	1,572,171	0.5	plus 21.5
USSR	14,855,983	4.3	minus 11.9
Hungary	5,930,050	1.7	plus 24.6
Sum Total	36,483,383	10.5	minus 1.2
World Total	348,339,135	100.0	plus 4.7

Trading Partner	1984	Percentage of total Austrian imports	Percentage change
Bulgaria	665,870	0.2	plus 42.4
CSSR	7,863,290	2.0	plus 6.7
GDR	2,540,664	0.6	minus 6.8
Mongolia	724	0.0	minus 7.7
Poland	5,035,352	1.3	plus 41.4
Romania	1,704,165	0.4	plus 8.4
USSR	19,625,299	5.0	plus 32.1
Hungary	8,110,884	2.1	plus 36.6
Sum Total	45,546,248	11.6	plus 24.8
World Total	392,093,921	100.0	plus 12.6

Trading partner	1985	Percentage of total Austrian imports	Percentage change
Bulgaria	764,365	0.2	plus 14.8
CSSR	8,328,997	1.9	plus 5.9
GDR	2,641,588	0.6	plus 4.0
Mongolia	1,321	0.0	plus 82.5
Poland	4,773,377	1.1	minus 5.2
Romania	1,609,381	0.4	minus 5.6
USSR	19,150,890	4.4	minus 2.4
Hungary	8,501,940	2.0	plus 4.8
Sum Total	45,771,859	10.6	plus 0.5
World Total	430,969,325	100.0	plus 9.9

AUSTRIAN EXPORTS (in 1,000 schillings)

Trading partner	1983	Percentage of total Austrian imports	Percentage change
Bulgaria	2,602,255	0.9	plus 24.5
CSSR	2,586,145	1.3	minus 14.4
GDR	6,327,799	2.3	plus 76.8
Mongolia	22,999	0.0	minus 51.4
Poland	3,101,495	1.1	plus 36.6
Romania	1,027,982	0.4	minus 38.2
USSR	10,782,253	3.9	plus 14.1
Hungary	6,112,228	2.2	minus 4.9
Sum Total	33,563,156	12.1	plus 13.1
World Total	277,139,438	100.0	plus 3.9

Trading partner	1984	Percentage of total Austrian exports	Percentage change
Bulgaria	2,287,851	0.7	minus 12.1
CSSR	3,498,431	1.1	minus 2.4
GDR	6,806,967	2.2	plus 7.6
Mongolia	16,312	0.0	minus 29.1
Poland	3,401,127	1.1	plus 9.7
Romania	1,123,133	0.3	plus 9.3
USSR	14,072,861	4.5	plus 30.5
Hungary	6,959,775	2.2	plus 13.9
Sum Total	38,166,457	12.1	plus 13.7
World Total	314,504,394	100.0	plus 13.5

Trading partner	1985	Percentage of total Austrian exports	Percentage change
Bulgaria	2,706,174	0.8	plus 18.3
CSSR	3,888,223	1.1	plus 11.1
GDR	4,413,881	1.2	minus 35.2
Mongolia	20,993	0.0	plus 28.7
Poland	4,288,518	1.2	plus 26.1
Romania	1,130,534	0.3	plus 0.7
USSR	13,409,894	3.8	minus 4.7
Hungary	9,162,188	2.6	plus 31.6
Sum Total	39,020,405	11.0	plus 2.2
World Total	353,962,448	100.0	plus 12.5

Gleissner points out that short-term predictions for the further development of East Bloc trade are not very favorable due to the decline of the price for energy.

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CSO: 3620/43

ECONOMIC

BELGIUM

WATHELET ON WALLOON REGIONAL FINANCES, ECONOMY

Brussels LE SOIR in French 16 Sep 86 p 2

[Interview with Belchior Wathelet by Guy Duplat, date and place not provided]

[Text] In spite of the rain, Martens' week-end shouldn't have been all that gloomy. The interprofessional agreement reached at dawn on Friday morning was a veritable godsend for the prime minister. With the start of construction on the Val Duchesse highway last July, this marks the second major harvest that Martens' program has reaped and tucked safely into the silos.

Even so, the battle is not yet over for the man who challenges the deputy from Ghent. The Community spokesman, as we all know, has his big nose sniffing in that quarter. Tomorrow—Tuesday—the fourth chamber (Flemish) of the Council of State will sit; perhaps jointly with Happart when things quiet down. Furthermore, Val Duchesse is still an everyday bone of contention. This is why Melchior Wathelet is sticking his own knitting needles into the ravelling process others have already begun.

[Question] The government is asking for 6.5 billion in savings for 1987, to come from the regions and communities. In your view, is that an impossible demand?

[Answer] I think everybody would agree right now that we cannot alter the regional grant appropriations. That means that we shall have to sit down and negotiate, to find other ways to save money. And we are ready to do so.

[Question] But what about the 6.5 billion?

[Answer] Those numbers are fake! The government forgets that it has, among other things, imposed economy measures on the back of the communes and that we must, to some degree, make up for that. It forgets that it has wiped out the 400 million called for this year and the 800 million promised for next year in funding for our industrial comeback. Most important, though, it seems to have forgotten the 220 billion in arrears on the low-cost housing program. On the Friday before Pentecost, I agreed to pay a portion of that enormous debt, amounting to 7 percent of the regional allocation. What it will boil down to is the 6.5 billion from Val Duchesse or that Thursday agreement: You can't have both!

[Question] In other words, you do not want to make such massive cuts in spending as the national ministerial departments would like you to make. That's not a terribly courageous attitude..

[Answer] But it is precisely because we went through our own Val Duchesse back in 1980, when they passed the regionalization laws. They worked out a very miserly funding plan, far from adequate to deal with the responsibilities that were shifted onto our shoulders. When low-cost housing was run by the national government, it ran up 220 billion in debt. Since housing was regionalized, nobody has built any housing for the low-and middle-income people. They regionalized urban renewal without any funding and we were unable to complete the major projects undertaken before 1980, etc. And despite that 1980 Val Duchesse, our budget since 1980 has been balanced. With that in mind, there can be no question of saddling us with the same percentage of budget cuts as that borne by the central government.

[Question] But does that mean undoing Val Duchesse?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] In order to break out of the current deadlock, they plan to force you into spending cuts by regionalizing such para-governmental agencies (water, housing, employment), without providing you with the means to pay for them?

[Answer] I repeat that I am ready to make cuts, and I don't much care what form they take. If they prefer to do it via gratuitous transfer of the para-governmental agencies, why not? Just let them show some moderation in mandatory spending cuts, as I said before! It's Mr Geens, who presides over the Flemish executive body, who doesn't like anything about this transfer of the para-governmental agencies.

[Question] There is a lot of talk here about vast sums of money and about distributing them.

[Answer] True. The Act of August 1980 is an absurdity. It lumps regional responsibilities together with tax refunds that have nothing to do with those responsibilities. They made up their minds, for instance, to regionalize the water supply problems, but to pay for it they regionalize the real property taxes! That is ridiculous! The two have nothing to do with one another! There is no funding to cover the real needs! And so I say that, given the conditions set by the August 1980 law, I cannot accept an additional autonomy as Geens would have me do. I cannot in conscience do it, and in refusing I am upholding the interests of Belgium and of the Walloons. I want to see some real negotiations about funding before there is any discussion of additional autonomy.

[Question] Would CVP Eric Van Rompuy say that the Walloons are penniless beggars, if they refused to adopt the principle that everybody ought to pay his own way?

[Answer] There is a spiteful arrogance about Erik Van Rompuy, mixed with fantasies about territorial rights. Everybody has his holy wars! I would answer no: we are not beggars. But if somebody is bound and determined to regionalize, I demand that Flanders not be permitted to make that decision unilaterally.

[Question] You are very proud of your Wallonie, but, at a time when the A.C.E.C., Cockerill-Sambre, and Tubemeuse are up to their necks in problems, shouldn't you be more prudent?

[Answer] The heart of Wallonie does not beat in pure harmony with Cockerill-Sambre as it did a few years ago. A lot of little plants and businesses cropped up, which, taken together, mean that unemployment is on the decline in Wallonie, that industrial production here is rising faster than anywhere else in Belgium since the start of this year—while Flanders looked on Wallonie as backward until the end of the century! The net rate at which new companies are springing up is faster here than anywhere else. We have the highest productivity. No, I think that, like trees, the one that falls makes a very loud noise, but the one that is growing makes none at all.

[Question] Tell me: are the A.C.E.Cs cruelly short of government orders?

[Answer] A country, our country, can progress only if it is fair in placing its procurement orders among its regions. But, from another angle, we must pool our efforts so as to become less dependent on government orders. In the area of industrial policy, furthermore, I think we shall have to shift far more away from a subsidized system and toward a system of tax incentives.

[Question] Let's talk about your Walloon executive branch. Nobody seems to talk about it very much...?

[Answer] That's because happy people have no time for fussing and feuding. If we are at odds we make big headlines, but our problem is that we listen to one another. When a plane crashes people talk about it, but when it takes off safely every day, there's not a line about it in the papers.

[Question] Increasing your majority is not on your agenda?

[Answer] No!

[Question] But you do have some plans?

[Answer] Of course we do. Among them are budget reform, which will simplify and clarify our accounts, and administrative reforms. Our administration could become a laboratory for government. We shall be setting up a marketing office, in charge of promoting public service, and it will have an ombudsman service. In short, we intend to manage human resources, as we learned in American universities.

[Question] You plan to go to Flanders Technology next May, even though Dehousse refused to go?

[Answer] Why shouldn't Wallonie attend such a salon? After all, we go to Japan, or to Quebec, don't we?

[Question] Let's wind up with Happart. What do you think of his possibly being stripped of his office?

[Answer] Of course, we are waiting for the State Council's decision, but the French-speaking position is clear: communal democracy must prevail. The law and the constitution lay down no particular condition whatsoever. I must add, though, that, sound as the French-speaking community's argument is, the man who is its symbol and spokesman poses some problems. Jose Happart has taken on a political coloration, which is precisely the same as that of the members of Parliament who herded the Fourons off to Limburg. And I think that, if I were mayor, I would make it a point of honor to speak the mother tongue of 30 percent of my constituents. I repeat, however, that none of this goes to the root of the problem.

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CSO: 3619/1

BELGIUM

ECONOMIC

NATIONAL BANK SEES GOVERNMENT FIGURES AS TOO PESSIMISTIC

Brussels LE SOIR in French 20/21 Sep 86 p 2

[Article by Vanden Driessche: "1986 Budget: Martens VI Too Pessimistic, The National Bank Corrects Its Range"]

[Text] Martens is a little bit wrong, but Spitaels is not entirely right. As a matter of fact, in a 1986 budget analysis, the National Bank reviewed the impact of the decisions of the Val Duchesse plan discernable in 1986. And it concluded that expectations for the 1986 Treasury budget balance could undoubtedly prove to be somewhat too pessimistic: The budget balance would gain 15.5 billion over the amount called for in the general budget report. "Good," said Minister of Budget Guy Verhofstadt commenting on this conclusion.

The report of the National Bank obviously emphasizes that the measures chosen in Val Duchesse primarily affect 1987. Some of them, however, should begin to be felt as early as 1986, with the result that some 62.4 billion in savings would already be realized this year. These 62.4 billion mainly affect expenses: 36 billion in current expenses and 13 billion in capital expenditures, the balance being obtained from a 13 billion appreciation of the yield of certain current Treasury revenues and from one billion picked up again at FRI. To be sure, this report dates back to 8 August last. The results it offers, however, are not affected by a significant change in context, which could have changed neither the chosen hypotheses prevailing in the preliminary budgetary works, nor the basis of the achievements of the early months of the year. Thus, in light of the Val Duchesse decisions, the National Bank concludes from the analysis of the reduced Treasury expenditures and improved revenues that, in addition to 4 billion the breakdown of which cannot yet be done, the largest share of the 1986 reorganization will consist of efforts imposed directly on companies and individuals and for substantial amounts: 19.5 to 15.5 billion. It remains to be noted, adds the National Bank, that the savings requested by the state from the public transportation and communications companies will more than likely be achieved to the detriment of individuals since they will be expressed for the most part through the loss of jobs. Net state investments and purchases of goods and services should drop by 7.4 and 4.8 billion and the net balance to be financed through the Treasury would be reduced by 6 billion in interest charges. Two billion should be released to local authorities in terms of transfers and the same amount to the other authorities. The report emphasizes, however, that it concerns gross

savings whose multiplying effects in terms of losses derived from additional revenues or expenses in unemployment benefits cannot be neglected. It is thus advisable to take into account the growth of the GNP corrected by the influence of Val Duchesse.

Analysis of current fiscal and non-fiscal revenues and of the first 1986 achievements and the similar analysis of expenses led the research service to a certain number of adjustments and personal conclusions. And these conclusions cast a doubt on the government's certainty: As a matter of fact, the National Bank wrote that "From what may be gathered from the previous parties, the budget provisions pertaining to the 1986 Treasury budget balance could undoubtedly prove to be slightly too pessimistic. As a matter of fact, the appreciation of current revenues, approximating 17 billion tied to a more than expected substantial economic growth and an approximate saving of 15 billion at the level of the public debt budget, would only be partially compensated by various budgetary surpluses which may be anticipated in terms of current and capital expenditures. The 1986 Treasury budget balance would amount to 542 billion, or 15.5 billion less than the amount called for in the general budget report." The National Bank adds that, on the whole, taking into account treasury transactions the estimate of which is realistic, the Treasury financial deficit would reach 15 billion less than anticipated and would account for 11.1 percent of the gross national product as compared to 12 percent for the previous year. Finally, if the financial deficit is about the same in 1986 than in the first 7 months of last year, the possibility of a deficit slightly lower than that of the budgetary forecast cannot be excluded, says the National Bank, since two factors are still liable to slant the comparison between the 2 years, namely, the effects of the Val Duchesse plan, which will be felt most of all in the second semester, and the different distribution in the timing of certain payments charged to the Treasury. Is Martens VI too pessimistic? That was the comment made by Guy Spitaels, president of the Socialist Party, in our publication; he spoke about a surplus of 70 billion which could be available in 1986 and 1987. Minister of Budget Guy Verhofstadt stated ironically: "So, I see that the National Bank agrees with the government more than it does with the leading president of the opposition." But joking aside, let us stay with 1986. On this subject, Guy Verhofstadt points out that 15 billion account for no more than 0.75 percent of the 200 billion savings expected in the Val Duchesse plan. He adds: "Let us hope, however, that it is true; this shows that we are cautious people."

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CSO: 3619/2

ECONOMIC

BELGIUM

GEENS ON FLEMISH, WALLONIA ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TRENDS

Brussels LE SOIR in French 20/21 Sep 86 p 2

[Text] "Economic indicators are all going in the same direction and describe a two-speed Belgium." Gaston Geens, president of the Flemish executive, picked up again one of his favorite themes during the presentation of a review of the Flemish regional economy over the last 5 years and of Professor Daems', from the KUL, study on the two structural characteristics of the Flemish industry. He also voiced a few puzzled thoughts concerning an economic and monetary union between partners with different growth rates, pointing out that the political consequences of the situation would have to be analyzed, especially on the subject of transfers. He immediately added, however, that "any improvement for Wallonia is also good for Flanders, firstly, because we coexist within an economic and monetary system, secondly, because Wallonia and Brussels are our best customers and vice versa."

What are the indicators on which, one more time, the president of the Flemish executive relies to ascertain his claim to a "two-speed Belgium?"

1. The general economic situation indicator: Since 1985, the Wallon curb has been dropping under that of Flanders, but, for all that, the last months of 1986 have registered an upswing movement which does not exist on the Flemish side where the decline has been steady since the beginning of last year.
2. The potential industrial employment rate: Better in Flanders but, overall, with a less than satisfactory trend for this year, whereas Wallonia, on the contrary, is progressing.
3. The industrial production index (except for the building trade): It has been growing in Flanders since 1981, whereas its development has been more uneven in Wallonia, and, once again, showing a decline in 1986.
4. Industrial investments: Those made in Flanders have caught up with and exceeded those made in Wallonia in 1984 and their rate has remained higher ever since, even if there has been evidence of recovery in Wallonia since 1985 to mid 1986.
5. The small business turnover: It stopped increasing at the same rate, even though it is growing in the two regions: The rise is slower in Wallonia.

Similar curbs but, once again, with one-level lag, unfavorable to Wallonia for exports.

6. Total number of unemployed receiving benefits: Curbs crossed late in 1985 with Wallonia rallying...

7. Total number of unemployed 25 years old and under receiving benefits: The curbs shows a more stable profile in Wallonia than in Flanders, where, in absolute figures, their number is evidently greater. Larger and younger population: No mystery in this difference.

8. Job seekers: This last comparison was made with job seekers for the whole of Europe of the Ten: Since 1984, a drop in their number has distinguished Flemish development whereas their number continues to increase for Europe as a whole.

Flanders Technology

From a more general standpoint, the diagrams in Geens' report show that development has been parallel more than it has been different, but with a certain lag in level. The president of the Flemish executive also announced the launching of "P Days," that is to say, "projects days," in three regions (Limbourg, Campine and Westhoek) which greatly need to sell themselves to investors. Flanders too, sometimes, has two speeds. As for the third Flanders Technology event, it should have a "tremendous success": The new fair center, which will house it, will be completed late this year and 40 percent of the space has already been reserved by the 300 participants already registered. The United States and the USSR should be participating in this third fair, whereas Wallonia, Italy, Quebec Province, Australia and France took options on stands. With regard to advanced technology, Professor Daems' report notes that, proportionally, Brussels has more jobs to offer in that area even if, in absolute numbers, more jobs in this sector are found in Flanders. He further added that in Flanders the potential for jobs in research and development doubled between 1975 and 1981.

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CSO: 3619/2

ECONOMIC

TURKEY

REPORT ON SECOND REVISION OF FOREIGN TRADE GOALS

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 5 Sep 86 p 1

[Article by Erdal Saglam: "Foreign Trade Goals Revised Second Time"]

[Text] Ankara - Minister of State for Economic Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister Kaya Erdem and State Planning Organization Undersecretary Yusuf Bozkurt Ozal attended a meeting in Ankara day before yesterday at which the macro economic indicators for the first half of the year were reviewed and the 1986 goals were revised as a basis for the 1987 program, it was learned. Import and export figures, changed once before on the basis of developments during the year, were changed again, setting Turkey's final 1986 export figure at \$8 billion and imports at \$11.5 billion.

Exports had first been set at \$8.7 billion in the 1986 program, but owing to the oil-producing nations' reduced income in the early months of the year and the consequent downward trend of exports, Turkey's exports for this year were revised to \$8.2 billion. The goal was again slimmed down in light of exports accomplished in the first 6 months, and Turkey's final export target for 1986 was set at \$8 billion. The 1986 import target, meanwhile, had been set at \$12.1 billion in the program but was reduced to \$11 billion because of the expectation of a reduced oil bill and has been raised again and given final form at \$11.5 billion. Despite estimates that Turkey's 1986 oil bill would be half of the previous year's, import targets had to be raised again, admitting it to be "an indicator of Turkey's inability to take adequate advantage of the drop in world oil prices."

Higher Exports

Meanwhile, earlier estimates, based on declining world oil prices, that the 1986 oil bill would be less than \$1 billion were reportedly redesignated at a little over \$1 billion at the recent meeting owing to the rising trend in prices.

Also discussed at the meeting attended by Kaya Erdem and Yusuf Bozkurt Ozal were "solutions proposed for getting the declining trend in exports back up." A decision in principle was reportedly agreed upon at the meeting for stressing investment incentives to increase exports.

ECONOMIC

TURKEY

TRADE RELATIONS WITH HUNGARY, COMECON REVIEWED

Istanbul DUNYA (Supplement on Hungary) in Turkish 22 Jul 86 p 2

[Article by economist K. Naci Sahin: "Counter-Trade and COMECON"]

[Text] Barter is the oldest known form of trade in the history of mankind. With the invention of money, the barter system yielded to the familiar process of buying and selling, to the trade in goods, having given "equitable" service to mankind; nevertheless, the barter system has survived to this day as the purest form of trade.

When the explorations that began with the new era resulted in the discovery of America and the sea routes to Africa, India, and China, the barter system assumed international dimensions. Wealth and slaves from these newly discovered regions began to be brought to Europe in exchange for copper, wine, wheat, horses, textiles, and weapons. With the development of international trade, the extensive use of the precious metals gold and silver in trade was followed in the 19th century by that of banknotes of a given gold value.

With the speedy development and integration of national and international trade that followed the industrial revolution, various monetary systems of international significance evolved and survive to this day. Nevertheless, with the introduction of new concepts in international trade in recent years -- such as counter-trade and compensation -- the exchange of goods, of which barter is the purest form, has gained a new immediacy.

Great crises of international dimensions, especially in the aftermath of World War II, and the problems encountered by developing countries in the process of development have resulted in large balance of payments deficits for these countries. When the difficulties faced by COMECON countries, with their nationalized external trade, to meet their growing hard currency needs were added to these problems, the exchange of goods on various scales and using various methods such as counter-trade and compensation began to be applied in international trade at an accelerated rate. This method, in essence, is as follows: a country that wishes to import goods from another country stipulates that a certain proportion of the payment for its imports will be paid for by exports to the other country. Thus, both countries in question manage to export their own products and, without spending any hard currency, acquire the products they want.

They method is currently used mainly by countries that have nationalized their foreign trade (including intergovernmental deals involving oil), and by COMECON countries in particular.

From the 1970's onward, the COMECON countries, beginning with the Soviet Union and followed by the rest of the COMECON members. Have been proposing the counter-trade-compensation system as a condition, particularly for the purpose of overcoming the deficit in their foreign trade with the OPEC countries. The state corporations for foreign trade in COMECON countries have had definite instructions to balance their imports with exports, both on a current basis and within the framework of their global activities, on conditions whereby they achieve a net profit in the end. Naturally, this practice could not have been expected to yield great and decisive solutions at once, but over a period of some 10 years, COMECON member countries have largely overcome the deficit in their trade with the OECD. During this period, COMECON countries have adopted a number of administrative decisions to facilitate counter-trade and compensation transactions, and as a result, the ratio of this kind of transaction in the total international trade of these countries has risen steadily.

In the beginning, Western companies were reserved in their attitude toward this development, thinking that such methods would create practical difficulties and waste time, but with the growing conviction that this system was here to stay, they adapted to the situation and produced commercial, servicing, and financial establishments or departments specializing in this kind of trade.

It would be useful at this point to dwell upon the forms and elements of the counter-trade and compensation practices that we have tried to describe in brief outline. One faces a confusion of concepts, sometimes arising from faults in translation. The simplest, generally accepted description of counter-trade is: "agreement by the seller that part or all of the payment for the goods it sells will consist in purchases of goods (goods can be products, licensing, technology, etc.) from the purchasing country." It differs from normal trade practice wherein no counter-purchase is related to the export transaction or made a condition of exports.

There are many forms of counter-trade. These forms contain the following elements, with the form of counter-trade being determined by the nature and proportion of these elements that go into shaping it:

- Contract types, numbers, and restrictions introduced
- Goods involved in reciprocal exchange
- Parties besides the buyers and sellers
- The rate of exchange
- The time factor
- The form of payment

Counter-trade has two forms. The first is compensatory trade; that is, compensation that is concerned with an approximate exchange takes place not between governments but between companies and is applicable over a period of

less than 3 years. The second form involves large-scale, often government-to-government turnkey projects realizable over 3-35 years.

OECD studies on East-West trade and counter-trade practices have arrived at the following conclusions:

1. COMECON member countries will insist on counter-trade practices not only to balance external trade but because the products of COMECON member countries are not of a standard to enable them to compete in Western markets.
2. Unnecessary complications are proving impossible to prevent in practice. It is therefore necessary to take measures to prevent possible risks. Detailed research must be carried out, bearing in mind the various dimensions and forms of counter-trade, and risk-reducing arrangements must be introduced. All statistical data concerning general and specific practices must be gathered and very carefully examined.
3. Embarking upon long-term and balanced counter-trade with COMECON member countries on the basis of specific projects would be of greater advantage to both sides.

To sum up, these new methods arising from balance-of-payments difficulties that have entered international trade are now a fact. The share of these practices in international trade is steadily growing, and in the case of trade with COMECON member countries, they constitute the preferred method.

With few exceptions, foreign trade firms in COMECON countries are organized on the basis of products. Within the structure of these firms there are subsidiary organizations on a regional basis, and counter-trade transactions involving several firms are largely coordinated by the corresponding desks at the ministries of trade or by specialist firms.

In Hungary, a COMECON member country, there is no specialist firm for counter-trade. However, the special transactions unit that exists in almost every Hungarian foreign-trade firm is responsible for the coordination of counter-trade in issues that are within the area of operations of the firm in question. In Hungary, as in other Comecon member countries, those of the country's products that have the prospect of being sold for convertible currency are not included in counter-trade; conversely, they are eager to export in payment for their imports such of their goods as they have difficulty in selling or they have themselves imported from other COMECON countries on a ruble basis and on clearing accounts.

Hungarian foreign trade organizations treat scheduled imports needed for the economy differently from unscheduled imports. In the first instance, not only is there no requirement for counter-trade but also funds needed for the imports are allocated in advance. In the second, in those cases where the importing and exporting firms agree, the Hungarian firm either applies to the ministry for permission to import or may perhaps fortunately have on hand an import permit which it may put to use. If no import license has been obtained

the method of easing the way for getting it lies in creating the necessary funds either by importing products within the area of operations of the firm in question or -- if this proves impossible -- from other Hungarian external trade firms, thus creating the machinery to enable the use of these funds in the exports to be made to Hungary. The proportion of imports against exports varies, depending on the extent to which the imported and exported goods can be bought and sold for hard currency.

Select Turkish foreign trade firms have managed to adapt swiftly to these developments in international trade and have achieved deals in the realm of counter-trade practice that have had repercussions on an international scale. Turkey can, by overcoming difficulties encountered in practice, act as a bridge between Middle Eastern and COMECON member countries and thus both increase the prospects for selling its goods and improve its balance of payments by expanding the volume of its external trade and increasing its hard currency earnings through controlling the traffic in goods between third countries.

We consider that Hungary is a match for developed countries in the level of its development and in sociocultural fields, and that, because of the quality of its goods and its superior knowledge and experience in international trade, it constitutes a market for Turkey with a far greater potential than is currently being exploited. The difficulties encountered in the Hungarian market are no different from those in other markets. Moreover, the absence of quotas and so forth and the fact that Turkey has become a country that enjoys a preference in imports constitute an opportunity that our exporters must exploit.

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ECONOMIC

TURKEY

ADDITIONAL BORROWING SAID NECESSARY FOR DEBT PAYMENTS

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 5 Sep 86 p 4

[Report by Cetin Cetiner]

[Text] Ankara—We have been living continuously in debt and turning the millstones with carried water with a mentality of "debt drives the brave forward." Turkey, whose foreign debt totals \$27 billion, will have to make payments totaling \$1.3 billion in the last 4 months of 1986. Central Bank officials stated that these payments will necessitate additional foreign borrowing. Stating that as of the beginning of September \$2.9 billion was transferred in debt repayments out of a total of \$4 billion scheduled for this year, Central Bank officials said: "Of that amount \$1.7 billion was applied to the principal and \$1.2 billion was applied to the interest."

The Central Bank officials described the foreign borrowing necessitated by the principal and interest repayment schedule as "debt leads to debt." The officials recalled that Turkey fell into the debt swamp in 1977, that it became unable to repay its debts, that it repeatedly rescheduled its debts until 1982 and that it was eventually decided to pay the country's debts on an accelerated schedule in the years 1985 and 1986. Stating that the rescheduling of debts was in fact a "good opportunity" for Turkey, the officials said:

"Beginning in 1985, interest rates began to decline worldwide, and this was accompanied with a well-known decline in oil prices. The decline in interest rates reduced Turkey's dollar-denominated foreign debt repayment burden, but payments in non-dollar currencies, which constitute about 40 percent of the country's debt payments, rose in cost in terms of Turkish currency."

The officials indicated that real increases in the dollar's exchange rate as well as increases in the exchange rate of other currencies such as the deutchmark, the yen and the French franc, with respect to the Turkish lira, prevented Turkey from benefiting sufficiently from these favorable international developments. The captains of the economy said: "Even so, however, the decline in interest rates and oil prices have softened the effect of large-scale debt repayments on Turkey in 1985 and 1986."

Central Bank officials also reported that \$1.2 billion was borrowed in additional loans from abroad in the first 6 months of 1986 and that this amount may rise to over \$2 billion by the end of the year. The officials added that nearly \$400 million a month will be paid out in debt repayments in October and November 1986 and that this will almost certainly necessitate additional borrowing.

[Boxed item:] We Owe 365,000 Turkish liras Per Person

As Turkey's foreign debt increases, the burden on 51 million Turkish citizens is also mounting. Turkey's current debt of \$27 billion translates into \$529.41, or 365,292 Turkish liras for each Turkish citizen.

In the 1930's the Turkish Republic owed \$79.5 million to foreign countries, a legacy from the Ottoman Empire. At that time per capita foreign debt was \$4.48 or 5.87 Turkish liras.

9588

CSO: 3554/18

ECONOMIC

TURKEY

ARTICLE CALLS FOR NEW INCENTIVES TO BOOST EXPORTS

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 12 Sep 86 p 4

[Article by Dr Haluk Cillov: "The Need for Export Incentives"]

[Text] We note that exports have steadily declined in the first 6 months of the year. Indeed, our exports have declined from \$3.640 billion in the first half of last year to \$3.517 billion in the corresponding period of this year. It is evident that at this rate it will not be possible to attain the \$8-billion export target set for this year.

The failure of the present administration to repeat this year its export success of the previous two years is the result of various factors.

Firstly, there have been substantial declines in our exports to Iraq and Iran and even Libya. Moreover, export incentives in the form of tax rebates have been gradually reduced and even completely eliminated in some categories of goods. In addition, it is said that operations such as "imaginary exports," which were tolerated to a certain extent in the past, are controlled more tightly this year. Thus, the "export encouragement policy" run generously by the Undersecretariat of the Treasury and Foreign Trade has become a relic of the past. Finally, stagnation and protectionist policies in world trade have led to difficulties in exports to the EEC.

At the moment, one cannot say that Turkish exports benefit from any effective incentives other than exchange rate adjustments. So much so that, for example, although domestic cotton prices are about 25 percent higher than world prices, cotton yarn is expected to compete in foreign markets, but no one thinks about using the cotton stockpiles of the public corporations to help exporters to become more competitive.

Also, the efforts of large investment firms are no longer adequate. Exporting firms have gradually begun to prefer the import business.

Finally, one must not forget that the steady decline in the value of dollar has made exports less attractive.

In sum, it appears that the eagerness for and the dynamism in exports is on the decline.

Consequently, we will have to say that new export incentive measures are necessary and that, more importantly, these measures must be instituted without delay until our exports attain their true potential.

It is true that Turkey's signing of GATT in 1985 to the effect that "no subsidies will be provided for exports" will pose some practical obstacles. However, this agreement will go into effect in 1987, and, moreover, an extension may be possible.

What is important is to make sure that the new "incentives" to be introduced do not blindly support unfair competition or even smuggling.

In our opinion, exports can be encouraged most effectively by paying attention to the quality of the products to be exported, by definitively ending inflation which has been spurring domestic demand and by ensuring price stability.

Recent statistics indicate that the decline in exports is not restricted to agricultural products and that it has spread to industrial products. Consequently, the need to rescue our export trade from its current stagnant state is more urgent in view of its vital importance to our economy.

I hope that the mistakes made in the economic policies of the last 2 years have taught "many lessons" to our leaders.

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ECONOMIC

TURKEY

AGRICULTURAL GROWTH FORECASTS CALLED 'TOO OPTIMISTIC'

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 12 Sep 86 p 6

[Text] Ankara--Osman Ozbek, the president of the Administrative Council of the Turkish Union of Agricultural Chambers, said that "agricultural forecasts are made in accordance with what the heart desires."

Stating that his organization finds current forecast figures too optimistic, Ozbek said that the production of some agricultural products can be increased by about 10 percent this year through the use of good seeds and if weather conditions are favorable and that, however, that would not be enough to ensure a 7.1 percent growth in overall agricultural production.

Ozbek said:

"The forecast growth rate of 7.1 percent in agricultural production is too optimistic. That is a figure that may affect the gross national product. I believed that the rise of the agricultural growth rate from 2.7 percent last year to 7.1 percent this year would be a miracle."

Ozbek also insisted that the wheat harvest forecast of 19 million metric tons for this year is too high. He said: "Turkey has the potential for that much production, but it does not have that much production."

Noting that Turkey's annual demand for wheat is approximately 14 million metric tons and that, however, the announced wheat crop figures are too high, Ozbek said:

'We Will Go Hungry'

"Last year, it was announced that Turkey's wheat harvest was 17 million metric tons. Since domestic wheat consumption was 14 million metric tons, why did Turkey have to import wheat? Last year's wheat exports were not significant. If this year we export with expectations of a 19-million-metric-ton wheat harvest, we will go hungry."

Ozbek added that of 14.5 million metric tons of wheat consumed in Turkey, 10.5 million metric tons are consumed domestically, 1.5 million metric tons are used as animal feed and 2 million metric tons are used as seed.

9588

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ECONOMIC

TURKEY

BRIEFS

CEMENT FROM ROMANIA--Following the lifting of curbs on cement imports to improve the balance between supply and consumption of cement, a contract has been signed with Romania for the purchase of 140,000 metric tons of cement. According to the information obtained from Turkish Cement Producers' Association officials, 10,000 metric tons of the 150,000 metric tons of cement to be bought from Romania will soon be ferried to Turkish ports and will be shipped to regions where the shortage of cement is most acute. The cement bought from Romania was contracted at \$20.50 per metric ton. The officials noted that 9,000 metric tons of the 150,000-metric-ton contract was delivered in August. The balance of the contract will be delivered to Turkey in shipments of 10,000 metric tons each. [Text] [Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 5 Sep 86 p 9] 9588

ANKARA-ZURICH DIRECT FLIGHTS--Swissair, the airline of Switzerland and one of the premier air carriers in the world, is beginning direct air service between Ankara and Zurich. Stating that the service, which is currently envisaged at a frequency of two days a week, will begin on 26 October 1986, Swissair officials said that they decided to start this service following insistent requests from frequent passengers who live in Ankara. As is known, Swissair had a direct Ankara-Zurich air service previously, but it ended this service 4 years ago. Stating that the airfare for the Ankara-Zurich flight will be the same as that for the Istanbul-Zurich flight, the Swissair officials said that the daily Airbus flights between Istanbul and Zurich will continue unchanged. [Text] [Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 5 Sep 86 p 5] 9588

EEC CUSTOMS REDUCTION POSTPONED--The 10-percent customs duty reduction Turkey has agreed to implement for goods imported from EEC countries this year, has been postponed to 1 January 1987. The said Council of Ministers decision was published in yesterday's edition of the Official Gazette. [Text] [Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 12 Sep 86 p 6] 9588

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MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

ALPHA JET LINKS ANTI-HELICOPTER ROLE WITH GROUND SUPPORT

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 2 Sep 86 p 12

[Article by Siegfried Thielbeer: "Alpha Jet Against the Hind--New Method of Engaging Soviet Combat Helicopter"]

[Text] "What is the purpose of a Soviet helicopter equipped solely for combat?" The reason is clear to the commanding general of the British Rhine Army, General Farndale: If any weaponry system were suited for attack, the Soviet M-24 Hind undoubtedly is, and it is being introduced in increasing numbers to Soviet troops. The Hind is a true combat machine: not an antitank helicopter in the Western sense, it is more precisely an airborne armored combat vehicle. Equipped with eight laser-controlled antitank rockets, four rocket launchers for attacking area targets and a quad machine gun, this helicopter is meant to support Soviet troops on the battlefield. The lower side of the helicopter is reinforced with armor at its most critical points as a protective measure against enemy infantry fire.

In developing the helicopter, contrary to the Western practice of emphasizing lightness and maneuverability, the Soviet approach enhanced the survival chances of the vehicle using armor, weaponry and speed. Their operational principles also consider combat in enemy territory, which, excepting American helicopters, is avoided in Western countries, because these countries have considered the survival chances to be too low when encountering heavy air defenses.

There is another distinction between this vehicle and western combat helicopters: the Hind can also transport an infantry squad and their weaponry. This makes it particularly well suited for landing air storm troops behind enemy lines, since the vehicle can supply fire support. Like a combat airplane, this helicopter can accompany invading armored troops, immobilizing enemy defensive armor from the air. There is an astonishing similarity between the Hind specifications and those of a Soviet BMP armored vehicle. This was shown in a study of the Fund for Science and Politics, whose author, a former Polish officer, once participated in the development of this tactical concept: the Hind and the BMP can both carry an infantry squad of eight men, are both equipped with rockets and machine guns, and have a range of 300 km. The helicopter can apparently move across contaminated areas quickly in nuclear exchanges.

With its high velocity (320 km/hr versus approximately 220 km/hr for the BO-105 or the French Gazelle), the Hind can scarcely be engaged by Western helicopters and is in fact a serious threat to unarmored Western versions. Eventually the antitank rockets of the German Army, employed by helicopters and land vehicles, should also be capable of engaging helicopters, but not before the 1990's. How can troops defend themselves against the Hind in the meantime? Mobility and antiaircraft guns can be used against individual helicopters, but what happens if the helicopters appear in greater numbers? The Americans have examined some highly refined tactics for this. Their combat helicopter, the AH-1 Huey Cobra, and the Air Force A-10 Thunderbolt combat aircraft, work in concert against larger numbers of enemy armored vehicles. The helicopters fire far-ranging rockets from concealed positions at enemy antiaircraft guns, immobilizing infantry air defense with their machine guns. The extremely maneuverable Thunderbolt can then neutralize tanks using rockets and bombs and its 30 mm Gatling guns (firing 70 rounds per second). The armored Thunderbolt also protects its own troops from enemy helicopters. An American A-10 pilot stated, "We are not afraid of the Hind; they should be afraid of us."

Thus it is not surprising that the West German Air Force is also studying means of countering this new threat. What is required is a weapons system that would have to be faster than the enemy combat helicopter so it could pursue this vehicle and quickly provide a center of resistance. A capability of slower flight and high maneuverability would also be needed so that the enemy helicopter could not withdraw by virtue of its own maneuverability.

To some extent these prerequisites are fulfilled by the often underestimated German-French ground combat aircraft Alpha Jet, whose capabilities approach those of the A-10 Thunderbolt and are in contrast to the reduced flight range and weaponry of the Tornado. This unpretentious aircraft, of which the German Air Force has produced 175 units, flies at approximately 1000 km/hr, triple the speed of a helicopter. It is also extremely maneuverable at very low altitudes and can fly sufficiently slowly so that the pilot can recognize and engage helicopters. Since 1982, tactical employment exercises have been conducted by the air tactical training detachment of Fighter Bomber Air Wing 49 in Fuerstenfeldbruck and in German fall maneuvers. Large CH-53 army transport helicopters simulated the Hind. These exercises were successful.

The 27mm fixed guns and air-to-air rockets were also tested to determine if they could destroy the armored Hind. The commentaries from Alpha Jet pilots, even if dismissed to some extent, are clear: "This helicopter has no chances anymore." This small aircraft can overtake it, and the Hind, less mobile than Western helicopters, cannot escape once the dogfight begins. "Perhaps the helicopter could conceal itself in a forest clearing, but it would not be able to leave that area," stated an aircraft commander.

Whatever threats the Hind helicopter poses for Western armored vehicles and helicopters, it is inferior to the Alpha jet, including the range of its weaponry systems. The Alpha guns and air-to-air rockets exceed the capabilities of Hind machine guns and antitank guided missiles, respectively. This helicopter only finds protection in air defense groups, for its offensive capabilities are readily broken. The only difficulties are presented by operational coordination. Penetration by this helicopter must be recognized

rapidly and reported to air forces quickly. How can one distinguish at greater distances between friendly and enemy helicopters?

Defense ministry specialists articulate the solution: "Individual enemy helicopters will be able to get through, even in the future, and the local air defense forces of the army and air force must be prepared for this. But larger helicopter concentrations can be engaged by bombardment of their takeoff areas and through direct engagement by the Alpha jet." However, it is stressed that the chief task of the fighter bombers is engagement of the enemy land forces. Armor piercing guns, Maverick rockets and bombs are employed to provide close range air defense on the battlefield. "Thus the Alpha jet has no new mission, but has acquired a supplemental one. Above all, we are now in a position with this weapon to engage enemy helicopters."

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MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

DETAILS, DEVELOPMENT OF 'SKORPION' MINE SCATTERING SYSTEM

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Sep 86 pp 54-57

[Article by Guenter Schaefer: "SKORPION--A Modern Minelaying System of the Army"; first paragraph is WEHRTECHNIK introduction]

[Text] When tacticians think about a possible conflict these days, they will certainly reach different conclusions in many areas. But there is one thing that they will likely agree on in any case: on the contemporary battlefield, on which in part motorized and highly mobile armed forces oppose each other, the time lapse of the events is quite different from what one is accustomed to and is substantially faster. Mine warfare must adapt to these constraints. The existing possibilities for minelaying and the preparation of minefields by means of the--still necessary--hand laying, minelayer trailer with plow, and the firing of mine-ejecting projectiles of the artillery rocket system is now being supplemented through the SKORPION mine-launching system, in which minefields difficult to clear can be laid quickly and with great accuracy in every terrain still passable in a tracked vehicle. Delivery of the system, which is described in the following report, to the Bundeswehr began recently.

SKORPION dates back to a tactical requirement (TaF) from the year 1972, in which the equipment now being delivered to the field forces can be recognized only in its rudiments. It called for "mine dispensing devices" (MSM) for the dispensing of mines from vehicles, for the scattering in a range of up to 3,000 meters (abandoned in the definition phase for tactical reasons) and for the dispersing of mines from the air. The actual cluster weapons were spoken of as antitank and antipersonnel mines, the latter only as "desired," however. The minefields were to be difficult to overcome during their effective time. At the end of this time, through adjustable self-destruction, the clearing of the mines was not supposed to be necessary and the crossing of the mined terrain by vehicles was to be possible. At this point, it is not necessary to go into the tactical value of minefields, about which this magazine has often reported. Naturally the TaF for mine dispensing devices gave and gives a lot of attention to this aspect.

Material Development Process

The development process for today's equipment required about 10 years from the conceptual studies to the deployment authorization in the first quarter of 1983. It would require too much space to give all of the details.

But of special interest in this case is the fact that the prime contractor, the firm Dynamit Nobel, was facing the problem of developing a new mine launching system, for which there was nothing comparable anywhere that could serve as a basis, "around" an already developed antitank mine AT-2 (it was initially foreseen as a warhead for the light 110 mm artillery rocket). The astounding thing is that despite this starting position the development of the overall system was carried out without excessive use of resources and has the magnitude of "a half TORNADO." The initial thoughts on a carrier for the new mine launching system were concentrated on a wheeled vehicle of the follow-on generation of motor vehicles before turning to a tracked vehicle of the M-113 family beginning in about 1977. (Here as well arose the never-resolved difference of opinion about the advantage "wheel or track.") The armor-protection study was suspended for reasons of weight and mobility and in favor of the quantity of ammunition to be carried.

The dispersing of mines from the air as called for in the TaF took place very positively parallel to the "vehicle" development and led to a functional model of a helicopter conversion kit for the Bell UH-1D (that has already been given practical testing). In 1978, however, the demand was reduced because of the necessary saving of funds. But the requirement probably still exists.

In 1979, the term MSM/mine dispensing device was replaced by the planning term MiWS/mine launching system. The technical testing of the vehicle began that same year. The continuous driving testing of the mine launcher was carried out in 1981. The delivery of the launch vehicle of the type M548G A1 from the M-113 family to the future mine-launcher units for use as transport vehicles began that same year. The advantage not to be underestimated was that the units were able to become familiar with the vehicle and its features.

Technical testing of the overall launch system began in the fall of 1981 and field testing at the beginning of 1982. They led to type classification and to deployment authorization in the first quarter of 1983. The invitation to bid on production continued through the beginning of 1984 and the construction contract was signed in December 1984 with the prime contractor Dynamit Nobel.

It covers the construction of 300 mine launchers and, in a first portion, the delivery of 10,000 mine magazines with mines as well as reloadable training magazines.

The most important subcontractors are the Scherer firm for the retrofitting of the vehicle (the vehicles come to the firm "serviceable" from the field), the Honeywell firm with responsibility for the EPAG (adjust, test and fire device) and fuze components for the AT-2 mine, and the Krauss-Maffei firm, which builds the mine launching system and undertakes the final assembly and system testing for the mine launcher. The testing of the mine launcher inspection batches took place in the second quarter of 1986. In this connection, special

emphasis should be made of the fact that the basic material data on logistic readiness (and in the past that was a "weak point" in many systems) have been prepared and printed since the beginning of 1986.

The delivery of training ammunition and industrial training began even before the delivery of the first SKORPION mine launching system built with series funding to the field forces on 3 June 1986. Service ammunition, that is, AT-2 mines intended for operations, will be delivered to the field forces beginning in July 1986. About this time or a little later, series production will be increased to 12 mine launchers per month, so that it can be assumed that the program will end in late fall 1988. The principal users of the SKORPION will be the tank engineer companies of the brigades and the engineer battalions of the divisions.

The Mine Launching System MiWS

The mine launching system SKORPION, the details of which will be discussed in more detail in the following, has a total weight of 12 tons with a length of 5.85 meters, a variable width depending upon the transport, load or launch positions of the six mine launching units (these three positions are possible), and a height (over the machine gun) of 3.19 meters. The crew includes two soldiers: a driver and a system operator (from the cab).

The main components of the mine launching system are:

- the launch vehicle,
- the mine launching system with EPAG,
- the mine magazines with AT-2 mines.

Launch Vehicle

The already-mentioned launch vehicle M548G A1 is being used by the field forces as a transport vehicle and is furnished with the system. Propelled by a six-cylinder 154 kilowatt (210 horsepower) diesel engine, it attains a maximum speed in terrain of 40 kilometers per hour with an operating range (fully fueled) of about 500 kilometers. For its own protection, the vehicle has a Machine Gun 3 in the caliber 7.62 mm used by the Bundeswehr mounted on a rotary ring over the cab. As was already mentioned, armor for the cab was dispensed with for several reasons.

Mine Launching System With EPAG

Mounted on the load surface of the launch vehicle are six mine launching units that are horizontally and vertically (three positions) rotatable, into each of which five mine magazines are inserted from above. Each mine magazine has four ejection units each having five antitank throw mines. Thus each mine magazine contains 20 antitank throw mines and each of the rotatable mine launching units accommodates 5 magazines and thus 100 mines ready for launch, so that the combat-ready launcher carries 600 mines. The empty weight is 1,900 kg and the combat weight is about 4,000 kg.

The EPAG/adjust, test and fire device is the "fire control system" of the mine launching system. It is located in the cab and serves in the advance setting of the barrier data and in the automatic ejection of the mines. Keyed into the device before the beginning of the minelaying are the effective times of the mines (six are possible: from "short to long"), the mine densities, whether they are launched alternately to both sides or to one side, and whether automatically in accordance with the course or individually tubewise. The EPAG has self-testing, tests of the distance transducer, cable and ammunition, operational monitoring and an indicator for ammunition ready to be ejected.

Mine Magazine

The mine magazine is made of metal, is foamed out on the inside, and has the four already-mentioned ejection units that are glass fiber-reinforced plastic tubes. The five mines in each tube are launched simultaneously through a single pyrotechnic charge. The magazine is packaged in "expendable packaging" on a NATO palette and is reloaded by hand from the truck into the mine launching units. Armed for combat and with cabling, a magazine weight about 70 kg and its dimensions are a length of 728 mm, a width of 130 mm, and a height of 520 mm. The reusable training magazines were already mentioned.

Antitank Throw Mine AT-2

The AT-2 mine of the Dynamit Nobel firm is the same and can also be fired by means of rocket artillery. The only difference is that in artillery firing the mines come down with the help of a miniature parachute, whereas the thrown mines follow ballistic trajectories. When they hit the ground, they automatically put themselves in working position, extend the target sensor in the form of a thin-wired antenna, and arm themselves automatically. The initial arming procedure was performed when the mine was launched.

A shaped charge is triggered in the width of the vehicle when run over, when there is an attempt to remove it manually, and at the end of the programmed effective time (self-destruction). The shaped charge penetrates any known tank hull with an effect in the crew compartment. The AT-2 mine practically "sealed into" the mine magazine has a long storage time of at least 10 years; this is especially true for the battery as well. Each mine weighs 2.22 kg, the diameter of the mine body is 103.5 mm, and the height is 128.7 mm, 165 mm with the cover cap.

The tactical use of the AT-2 mine is largely fixed. To contain a tank attack, therefore, a density of 0.4 mines per running meter of barrier is taken as a basis because of the effect of the mines on the entire width of the tanks. A fully-loaded SKORPION can lay a corresponding barrier strip 1,500 meters long and about 50 meters wide within about 5 minutes.

In closing, it must be mentioned that besides the specifically named subcontractors a large number of other suppliers contribute to the overall system. Examples are the Eisenwerke Kaiserslautern with the welded platform,

Wegmann with platform parts, VALVO with integrated circuits for the mine and Kabelmetal Electro with a special cabling as well as a number of other sub-contractors.

In coining the term "new era" in the takeover of the first series equipment on 3 June 1986, Lt Gen Hans-Henning von Sandrart, army chief of staff, talked of the importance of land mine warfare in combined arms combat and its lasting improvement through the new SKORPION mine launching system. The chief of staff literally: "The further tactical-operational development of an up-to-date barrier capability as part of our defense readiness is not only a task of the engineers as part of engineer tactics. It is an important integral part of the further conceptual development of the system army as a whole."

Whereas the army chief of staff coined the concept of a "new era," Dr Homburg, member of the board of the prime contractor Dynamit Nobel, spoke with satisfaction on 3 June of a "world premiere." Indeed, nowhere in the world does SKORPION has a comparable counterpart.

9746

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MILITARY

SWEDEN

NEW SUPREME COMMANDER DISCUSSES DEFENSE GOALS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 3 Oct 86 p 6

[Article by Bengt Falkkloo and Anders Ohman: "New Supreme Commander Bengt Gustafsson: Difficult Task Ahead"]

[Text] A native of Skane who wanted to be a pilot but wound up instead as an officer in the engineers and built many bridges--that is Sweden's new OB [supreme commander of the Armed Forces], General Bengt Gustafsson, 53, who has now assumed his new post.

He regards himself as a good listener who tries to make other people's good ideas a reality. But being too spontaneous is his weak point, he says. So it is good to have colleagues who can hold him back.

The Soviet Union is not the biggest threat to Sweden's peace. In a wartime situation, either superpower is likely to take over the country or parts of it if necessary, he says firmly.

Bengt Gustafsson did not hesitate to compare weapons with Volvo automobiles and refrigerators when he talked to DAGENS NYHETER about the future of the Armed Forces. Striking a balance between personnel, organization, and equipment and between quantity and quality will be the new OB's hardest job.

He says: "We in the Armed Forces have been compensated [for inflation] as though we were buying Volvo automobiles and refrigerators. But we are buying defense materiel, an area in which the price trend has moved upward much faster."

That is why the Armed Forces are currently experiencing a conflict between quantity and quality. People in the Armed Forces are also becoming more expensive at a rate that keeps pace more or less with the growth in the national economy.

"If a sector of society is to continue to grow or at least to keep up with technological developments and make things better for its personnel, it must receive its share of national economic growth. That is something that we in the Armed Forces have not gotten for the past 15 years. Since 1972, our share

of the GNP has dropped from 3.4 percent to 2.7 percent. So it is not odd that there are conflicts within the organization and that we are worse off."

OB Level

If the Armed Forces gets the 3-percent annual increase in defense spending that is called in the "OB spending level," Bengt Gustafsson believes that the conflict "we are confronted with" will disappear.

At the OB level, fighter aircraft, surface attack vessels, and armored units--units of the kind that will be involved in a dueling situation in wartime--will have equipment just as good as that of an attacker.

The OB says: "Then we will be able to maintain an organization such that we will be able to defend this big country. Sweden's large land area with its many forests and difficult terrain requires many infantry units."

Continuing Overhaul

But the OB will continue to overhaul the peacetime organization. So far no one has come up with a good idea on what it should look like. It is not a good thing to close down regiments in various defense districts. The connection between society, people, and Armed Forces is "almost visible" in those regiments, he says. Some hopes were placed in the Army commander in chief's idea of having mixed services in the units. But that would have involved big investments and been unprofitable from the long-term standpoint.

The OB says: "The situation today is that we must continue with the pattern from the 1970's and close down regiments at random. We have not come across a good principle to follow."

Bengt Gustafsson was a member of the Commission on Compulsory Military Service (VK-83), and he says that certain changes in the length of military service may be considered. The absolute minimum is 7.5 months. It is conceivable that the current period will be shortened slightly in the case of companies with independent missions. The period needs to be lengthened for other groups. The training period for armored infantry units was recently lengthened to permit joint exercises. Some units should have more frequent refresher courses. They are required by the RBS-70 surface-to-air missile system, for example. The proficiency level at the start of refresher courses has been below what would be required at mobilization. Other missile units may need even more frequent refresher courses.

Very Good Contact

The OB laughed and said: "I thought it was encouraging that 55 percent of those due for refresher courses in the Goteborg District could be brought in for 1 week out of the year."

The new OB does not want to scrap the conscript conferences. They have provided him with very good contact "with the guys." But the elected

representatives of the conscripts should visit the minister of defense to discuss improvements in family allowances, daily pay, or other things.

The OB says: "If the politicians decide to increase their allowances, we in the Armed Forces should be compensated for it."

When DAGENS NYHETER met with Bengt Gustafsson, he was wearing a brandnew uniform for the day, with four stars on his shoulders and glistening oak leaves. He was also modeling the new 1987-style uniform with its short and stylish waist-length jacket.

The volunteer defense organizations in Kiruna presented him with a genuine Lapp knife when he left his post in Boden as commanding general of the military command to become OB. Engraved on the knife--made of reindeer antler and a first-class piece of Lapp workmanship--are the words: "To B. Gustavsson, our general."

The fact that his name is misspelled makes no difference. The new OB looks moved and proud.

DAGENS NYHETER saw him in the afternoon as he was leaving Armed Forces Staff Headquarters in Stockholm. He was jumping into his car with a game under his arm--yes, you guessed it: the Submarine Game.

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CSO: 3650/7

MILITARY

SWEDEN

CURRENT ORGANIZATION, ARMS, DEPLOYMENT OF SERVICES SUMMARIZED

Vienna OESTERREICHISCHE MILITAERISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT in German Sep/Oct 86
pp 468-474

[Article by Heinz Magenheimer: "Sweden's Armed Forces: Military System, Organization, Arms"]

[Text] Defense policy: Several military incidences along the Swedish coastline led not only to disagreements in foreign policy but also to discussions on the state of the country's defense. After the Soviet submarine U-137 of the W-class penetrated the skerries off the Karlskrona marine base in late October of 1981 "incidences" had also occurred in subsequent years: According to Swedish statements Soviet submarines had violated Swedish territorial waters at least five times in the summer and fall of 1985. The Swedish commander-in-chief, too, discussed these and similar incidences in November, which led a number of high-ranking naval officers to make critical comments on present security policy--some of them also in the daily press--and to warn against neglecting the defense readiness. (1)

On 29 October 1985, a Swedish reconnaissance ship "Orion" equipped with highly sophisticated electronics was rammed by a Soviet minesweeper east of the island of Gotland and suffered slight damage. The minesweeper evidently attempted to prevent the "Orion" from observing a Soviet fleet exercise. The incidence took place in open international waters, in a sea lane which both sides claim as an economic zone. Although the incidence was quickly settled through diplomatic channels, it revived the discussion on defense problems. A new "realism" seemed to prevail in certain sectors of the public. (2)

The sea waters mentioned where the collision took place have been a subject of negotiations between Sweden and the Soviet Union for many years: While Sweden wants to make the center line between Gotland and the Baltic coast the border, the Soviets insist on a border halfway between the coasts of the two mainlands.

If this area would be declared a "gray zone" as the Soviet would like, the Soviet navy could operate as close as 12 miles off the island of Gotland. The negotiations which were continued in March of 1986 have not yet brought any results.

The Swedish national defense is faced with the challenge of organizing and arming the armed forces to meet potential threats and at the same time make do with an ever decreasing share of the national income. The build-up of strong Soviet land, air and naval forces on the Kola peninsula and in the Murmansk-Severomorsk area is considered to be a particularly important factor.

Another geographical problem is the long east and south coast. There is general agreement that much stronger naval forces than the current ones would be required to effectively monitor this coastline. Due to the country's large north-south distance (approximately 1,500 km) and the small population (8.33 million) relative to the national territory the ability to respond quickly once the intentions of an attacker have become clear is a basic requirement. However, because of operative problems and other conditions--mobilization, transport--a quick concentration of forces is considered to be very difficult to achieve. To make up for at least some of these disadvantages the air force in particular is responsible for delaying enemy attacks as long as possible to gain time for completing the mobilization.

In the past few years the percentage share of defense expenditures has decreased; already in 1972 a "zero growth" had been decided upon in view of the disarmament policy. Between 1967 and 1974 the defense budget including expenditures for civil defense increased by an average of 1.2 percent annually, while these sectors increased by a total of only 3 percent in the years 1975-1983. For fiscal year 1985/86 (starting 1 Jul 1985) 25.1 billion Swedish kronor were appropriated; this is slightly more than 3 percent of the gross national product and almost 8 percent of the national budget.

In the past few years the tight budget situation has led to the closing or shut-down of garrisons, echelons, and naval units. As an example, in 1972 the air force still had, for instance, 33 fighter and fighter bomber echelons, while slightly less than 18 such echelons were in service in 1982. (3)

Even if the reason given for the reduction in units and equipment is the disproportionately fast rise in the cost for arms and equipment, the preparation of the 5-year defense plan which will take effect in 1987 has come under certain pressure. While the government estimates a maximum total sum of slightly less than 117 billion Swedish kronor for the years 1987-1992, the commander-in-chief advocates a minimum amount of 124.8 billion Swedish kronor, which would make it possible to modernize the forces of all military branches. An annual increase of 3 percent would seem to be absolutely essential. In addition, the arms deficiencies which have been developing need to be corrected. (4)

The official security policy is based on the assumption that Sweden would not become the main target of an enemy attack, but would only be considered as a possible area for passage on land and in the air or as a base for an aggression which would be part of a more long-term, conventional war. Officially, it is expected that the forces directed against Sweden as part of a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact would only be of limited size.

However, the most recent statements by naval officers indicated that possible surprise actions in the air and at sea--for instance with air assault troops,

small submarines and commando units--to paralyze important bases are now given a greater chance of success. According to this view an invasion of Sweden with heavy losses would no longer be essential.

Army organization and mobilization: The military system is based on a general draft between the ages of 18 and 47. Basic military training lasts from 7.5 to 15 months depending on the service performed. This is followed by up to five repeat training periods, the first of which takes place four years after completion of the basic training with the remaining three to follow in 3-4 year intervals. For the average draftee the training periods last 8-17 days; they go up to 17 -31 days for company commanders.

At age 30 to 35 most draftees are moved to the territorial defense. In addition, there is the opportunity to do voluntary arms training. Draftees with reduced fitness will perform support services in case of mobilization.

Since 1 Jun 1983 women, too, have been eligible for military service. An officer career is also open to them. When they have reached the age of 18 men and women can also serve as volunteers in the home defense.

Sweden relies on the "cadre milita system", i.e. higher-level positions are held by active officers which leaves most of the training to the reserve and drafted officers. The current armed forces consist of approximately 18,000 military personnel, primarily officers with approximately 49,000-50,000 draftees annually in addition, who do their military service. In addition, the professional staff also includes approximately 23,000 civilian employees, and approximately 12,000 reservists in the officer corps. These reserve officers are called up at certain intervals to serve in their respective functions. As a cost savings measure it is planned to reduce civilian personnel by 6,000. (5).

When mobilization is completed after an estimated 3-4 days the armed forces will consist of approximately 800,000 men, i.e. almost 10 percent of the population. 300,000 of them will be in the army, approximately 300,000 in the territorial defense, approximately 100,000 in the home defense units, and the remaining 100,000 in the air force and navy.

The peacetime army organization with approximately 47,000 personnel is divided into six military regions, four of which encompass the central and southern parts of the country. The island of Gotland is under a separate military command which belongs to the "military region East". The military region commanders have under their command all formations of the three services stationed in their territory both in peacetime and in war. If needed, the military region commands which encompass a total of 23 defense districts form six corps commands, which have authority over divisions, independent brigades as well as units of the territorial defense. The equipment of the field army is kept in approximately 1,500 camps spread all across the country.

The peacetime organization relies on 42 regiments, i.e. battalion-size units of the different arms of the military which form and train complete units from the respective draft contingent for a possible war. Such a unit is maintained

for 10-15 years. A few years ago there were still 50 regiments, which have been reduced gradually. In addition, the army has 22 schools including 5 officer schools.

At present, the wartime organization of the army comprises 29 brigades, including 19 infantry brigades (of these 11 type 77 brigades and eight type 66 R brigades), four "Norrland brigades", four tank brigades, one mechanized brigade, and one "Gotland brigade". It is planned to combine several brigades into divisions, six of which can be deployed with the corresponding divisional troops. In addition to the brigades there are independent infantry, tank, artillery, and FIA-battalions. The territorial army has approximately 100 battalions and 400-500 independent security companies.

According to the parliamentary resolution of 4 Jun 1982, by 1992 the mobilization strength of the field army will be reduced to 26 brigades, including 5 tank and 5 Norrland brigades. As a comparison, in 1972 there were still 30 brigades.

The type 77 infantry brigade which is the most frequent one, is divided into three motorized fighter battalions (four rifle companies and one heavy company each), one reconnaissance, one tank rifle company (with combat tanks), one armored rifle battalion (motorized), one FIA-company, as well as one artillery, one pioneer and one supply battalion. The personnel level of 5,400 men is quite substantial.

In contrast to this organization the infantry brigade (type 66R) has only partially motorized battalions as well as one cycle battalion. By 1989 the army will have undergone a reorganization which will mean a better motorization of the infantry brigade "type 66R" so that six infantry brigades "type 66 M" will be created. These infantry brigades are primarily intended for combat in the border and coastal areas.

Of the existing 11 "type 77" infantry brigades one will be reorganized as a "Norrland brigade", which will result in a total of five Norrland brigade. This type of brigade differs from the infantry brigade 77 by the addition of a rifle battalion and is more mobile since it is equipped with snow-tractor vehicles. The personnel level is approximately 5,500 men. The plan is to reassign the Norrland brigades as a type 85 brigade by 1989. They are supposed to be fully equipped with field howitzers 77, a tank-FIA-company with nine guided missiles RBS-70 and an additional armored rifle company with PAL TOW. (6)

As part of the reorganization or reassignment it is planned to provide the infantry brigades with new vehicles including full-chain vehicles Bv 206 by 1989. It is noteworthy that the infantry brigades are relatively heavily equipped with anti-tank weapons: Each rifle company, for instance, has an rPAK-platoon 90 mm and the battalion itself still has such a platoon for 4 rPAK 90 mm. The armored rifle company of the brigade has 12 light tanks Ikv-91 (90mm) while the motorized armored rifle company has another six rPAK 90 mm on full-chain vehicles. The artillery battalion of the brigade is divided into three batteries with only four field howitzers 77 each (range 22-30 km).

The tank brigades with approximately 5,000 men are divided into three tank battalions (24 combat tanks per battalion), one artillery, one pioneer, and one supply battalion as well as one reconnaissance, one FIA-company and two armored rifle companies. Dividing the tank battalions into staff and supply sections and also into two tank and two armored infantrymen companies and one artillery battery each results in a mixed mechanized unit without a large number of tanks.

Among the combat tanks the turretless tank "S" (Strv-103) and the "Centurion" stand out. The current reorganization will result in a brigade type 63 M, which will include the combat rocket tank 551 with PAL TOW and the FIA-tank 701 equipped with the FIA-rocket RBS-70 "Robot". Both systems are based on a redesign of the previous cannon battle tank IKV-102/103. The two armored rifle companies of the brigade will be fused into a mixed armored rifle battalion.

Since most of the peacetime garrisons which consist mainly of 1-2 training battalions are located in the more densely populated southern and central part of the country, approximately south of the Karlstad-Uppsala-Norrtaelje line, large-scale movements to protect northern Sweden must be expected if a defense situation arises. A troop movement from the Stockholm area to Upper Norrland (Boden-Luleaa area) means that a distance of approximately 700 km must be covered.

In case of an attack against Upper Norrland four Norrland brigades, supported by 5 infantry brigades and 2 tank battalions will be responsible for delaying tactics and defensive combat. It is expected that it will take approximately one week to get the troops combat-ready and in place. Since the troops will be transported primarily by rail, securing railroad lines and train stations will be crucial. (7).

As several statements indicate the "weak point mobilization" will be improved: First, in coordination with their training schedules, each military branch will alternately provide a combat-ready infantry battalion which can be moved to any part of the country using C-130 transport planes. Furthermore, each military region keeps alarm companies and platoons in readiness to meet the requirements in their own territory.

With regard to armaments for the army the automatic rifle Ak-5 (5.56 mm) will be introduced shortly, as well as the 84-mm anti-tank gun AT-4 (range 300 m) which is also manufactured under license for the U.S. army. The Bofors Odnance company is developing the all-weather anti-tank missile BILL (RBS-56) which will be used in the rifle battalions starting in 1987. This weapon which proved to be promising in tests has proximity sensors which guide the missile to the target from above. In the future, the PAL TOW will also be used on the 20 anti-tank helicopters Bo-105, which were ordered in 1985.

Furthermore, the end-phase guided anti-tank projectile Strix is being developed in cooperation between FFV and Saab Missiles; it can be fired from the 120-mm grenade launcher at distances exceeding 8 km.

The search for artillery weapons includes a multiple rocket launcher, possibly based on the Haeggung BV-206 vehicle. Moreover, a target location system will be tested, i.e. a reconnaissance drone either with infrared sensors or as a video device. With regard to ammunition, end-phase guidance and sub-ammunition will be tested. Among the FIA-weapons the 40-mm Bofors cannon "Trinity" deserves mentioning which fires a novel ammunition with a proximity igniter which is highly efficient and has a rapid firing sequence. Redesigning the light tank Ikv-91 for a 105-mm cannon will hopefully lead to export orders. (8)

Compared to 1984, Sweden's weapons exports fell by 7.8 percent in 1985. In 1985 they amounted to 2.14 billion Swedish kronor which is 0.8 percent of total Swedish exports. In late March of 1986 a contract for delivery of 400 field howitzers FH-77 was made with India.

The air force: The air force consists of approximately 9,000 men and approximately 450 fighter planes; they have a high combat readiness even in peacetime. Some observers even consider the air force to be the most important component of Sweden's armed neutrality.

The deployment of the forces is as follows: (9)

4th squadron (Oestersund):	2 echelons (fighter) Viggen JA-37
5th squadron (training squadron) (Ljungbyhed):	4 echelons SK-60/SK-61 (training and light combat aircraft)
6th squadron (air attack command, Karlsborg):	2 echelons (air attack) Viggen AJ-37
7th squadron (air attack command (Saatenas):	2 echelons (air attack) Viggen AJ-37
10th squadron (Aengelholm):	3 echelons (fighter) Draken J-35 F2
13th squadron (Norrkoeping):	1 echelon (reconnaissance) Viggen SF/SH-37 1 echelon (fighter) Viggen JA-37 (One support echelon F-13M is in Malmslaatt)
15th squadron (Soederhamn) (air attack command):	1 echelon (air attack) Viggen AJ-37 1 echelon (multi-mission) Viggen SK-37
16th squadron (Uppsala):	2 echelons (fighter) Draken J-35 F-1/SK-35 1 echelon (air attack) SK-60
17th squadron (Ronneby):	1 echelon (fighter) Viggen JA-37 1 echelon (reconnaissance) Viggen SF/SH-37
21st squadron (Luleaa):	2 echelons (fighter) Viggen JA-37 1 echelon (reconnaissance) Viggen SF/SH-37

In addition, the 14th squadron should be mentioned which serves as a school for aviation and telecommunications training (Halmstad) as well as the 18th squadron (Tullinge near Stockholm) which is also set up as a pilot training center (pilot guidance services). Three squadrons (6th, 7th, and 15th) are

combined under the command of the air attack forces (Goeteborg) and are intended for missions on land and over sea.

In early 1983 the 1st squadron (Vaesteraas) which was equipped with Draken J-35 was closed down and the personnel and the planes were transferred to the Tullinge base. In late 1985 the 16th squadron discontinued one fighter echelon with Draken J-35 F-1. The two remaining echelons equipped with "Draken" will be re-equipped with "Viggen" in the course of 1986.

If the training squadron in Ljungbyhed is included there is a total of 10 squadrons (not counting the two schools in Halmstad and Tullinge). The echelons available are 11 fighter, six air attack, four light ground combat, three reconnaissance as well as one multi-mission echelon (re-equipment and training squadron), i.e. a total of 25 combat echelons. In addition, there is a transport echelon (C-130 Hercules) and 10 helicopter groups with one each assigned to a squadron airport. An echelon usually consists of 18 airplanes.

A few years ago, the reduction of the squadrons and echelons resulted in one fighter squadron each being placed under the command of an air defense zone: (10)

AD-Zone Upper Norrland:	21st squadron
AD-Zone Lower Norrland:	4th squadron
AD-Zone, center:	16th squadron
AD-Zone, south:	10th squadron.

Now that the 21st squadron has given up its Draken inventories and the 16th squadron will convert its two echelons which are equipped with J-35 F-1 to Viggen in the near future the three echelons of the 10th squadron in Aengelholm are the only remaining ones to fly the J-35 F-2. This squadron is also used for training the Austrian pilots on the J-35.

The most important plane in service is the Saab-37 Viggen which was introduced in 1971 and is used in the versions AJ-37 (air attack), JA-37 (fighter), SK/SH-37 (training, reconnaissance, attack against naval targets). Maximum speed is approximately Mach 2.0 at 11,000 m, the air attack version can carry approximately 7,000 kg of armaments, distributed among 7 external stations. A total of 329 Viggen units will be delivered.

Development and testing is concentrated on the multipurpose fighter plane JAS-39 "Gripen" by Saab-Scania; the decision to build it was made in 1979/80. In view of the cost the plan was to develop a plane which is smaller than the "Viggen", which would be adapted to the particular Swedish requirements and would cut the weight approximately in half thus enabling it to start and land on sections of the interstate system.

Furthermore, the JAS-39 was supposed to utilize the country's experience in electronics, avionics, and armament. In addition, the plan was to use system parts of foreign firms, for instance, the General Electric F-404 engine, but in a modified version. At the same time, a long-range anti-seacraft projectile (Rb 15F) was developed.

The "Gripen" is a plane with delta wings and slats which also functions as an air attack and reconnaissance plane in addition to its primary role as a fighter plane. The pulse-doppler-radar produced by Ericsson Radar Systems can locate and pursue several objects at the same time. According to Swedish data the electronic equipment which includes, for instance, an interference and a noise suppression device is highly efficient. (11)

According to current plans the first flight of the prototype will not take place until the second half of 1987 due to delays in putting the pilot guidance system in operation. Initially, 30 planes will be purchased. The cost of the total program is estimated at approximately 38 billion Swedish kronor by the turn of the century. The training plane JAS 349 which is under development competes with a potential advanced model of the Saab 105 SK 60.

The navy: With slightly under 10,000 men and 43 naval units of any size worth mentioning including 12 submarines this branch of the military seems to be in greatest need of reinforcement. The shipbuilding industry which is faced with great economic problems has shifted increasingly to export orders. For instance, patrol boats of the Stanflex 300 type are being built for Denmark in the "sandwich" mode. Plans are to expand the combat ship flotilla which consists of 30 units. Here, emphasis is on the Stockholm-class where each boat carries six naval target projectiles RBS-15. At present, four ships of the Stockholm-class, four minesweepers and four submarines are on order. The main bases are Karlskrona, Muskoe near Stockholm, Harnosand and Goeteborg.


The financing plan for the years 1987-1992 which was submitted by the commander-in-chief would make it possible to purchase 10 speedboats, two submarines and missiles against naval targets. The coastal defense, which is based on 30 mobile and fixed battalions with numerous artillery (105mm, 120mm, 152mm) would also be strengthened considerably. Therefore, it is expected that the next 5-year plan will set the direction for arms decisions in particular for the navy.

FOOTNOTES

1. See also: "Sweden--The Submarine Incidence: A Summary," in OEMZ 2/1982, p 169; FAZ 14 Nov 1985 ("New Submarine Debate in Sweden").
2. "Sweden's Difficult Relationship to the Soviet Union," in FAZ 11 Nov 1985, p 7; NZZ 7 Nov 1985, p 5.
3. WEHRTECHNIK 3/1984, p 64.
4. INTERAVIA AIR LETTER, 8 Oct 1985, p 6; NZZ 14 Feb 1986 ("Swedish Security Policy Discussions").
5. The Swedish Total Defense Information Committee, Stockholm 1983; WEHRTECHNIK 3/1984, p 63.

6. SOLDAT UND TECHNIK 3/1985, p 164; TRUPPENDIENST-pocketbook: "The Armies of the Neutral and Non-Aligned Countries in Europe" (Vienna 1986), p 159 ff.
7. "Neutrality at the Intersecting Point of the Two Military Alliances," in NZZ 9/10 Feb 1986, p 6.
8. General information on this subject: John Reed, "The Scandinavian Armaments Industries," in : ARMADA INTERNATIONAL 1/1986 p 12 ff; MILITARY TECHNOLOGY 3/1986, p 18 ff.
9. DEFENSE UPDATE, June 1982, p 20.
10. TRUPPENDIENST 3/1983, p 326.
11. MILITARY TECHNOLOGY 3/1986, p 23; AEROSPACE, Oct 1983, p 14 ff.

Map: Higher Commands, Bases, and Garrisons in Sweden



Key:

1. Garrisons with at least 1 battalion / School
2. Military region East
3. Support sections for the 13th squadron
4. 10th squadron
5. Training squadron
6. Air attack command
7. Naval base
8. Atlantic Ocean
9. Norway
10. Sweden
11. Upper Norrland
12. Lower Norrland
13. Supreme command
14. Military command, military region East
15. East
16. South
17. Training
18. Gulf of Bothnia
19. Finland
20. Latvian SSR

12831

CSO: 3620/20

MILITARY

TURKEY

BRIEFS

EGYPTIAN TANK CANNON CONTRACT--Turkey, which has bought production licenses from various foreign high-technology firms for many years, will soon take the first step toward selling a production license. According to the information obtained, MKE [Machine and Chemical Industry Establishment] has won first place in the bid Egypt opened some time ago for the supply of and production licenses for 105-mm tank cannons and munitions. Thus, MKE has won the right to license Turkish patents for tank cannons to be manufactured in Egypt. Officials reported that in addition to MKE, the Santa Barbara corporation from Spain and the PRB corporation from Belgium bid on the Egyptian contract and that only MKE's bid was found favorable in technical and price terms. The \$4 million contract for the sale of manufacturing licenses for 105-mm tank cannons and munitions is expected to be signed soon by Egyptian government officials and the MKE Directorate General. After the accord is signed, tank cannons will begin to be manufactured in Egypt under a Turkish patent. [Text] [Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 5 Sep 86 p 9] 9588

F-16 ENGINE TESTING CONTRACT--The Alarko firm is reported to have won the contract for the construction of the engine-testing facilities for the F-16 military aircraft factory in Murted. According to the information obtained, a 5-billion-lira contract has been signed with Alarko for the construction of the F-16 engine testing facilities. The construction of the facilities will begin next month and will be completed by the end of 1987. [Text] [Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 12 Sep 86 p 6] 9588

CSO: 3554/16

ENERGY

TURKEY

GASOLINE STANDARDS RAISED

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 12 Sep 86 p 3

[Text] Ankara (TERCUMAN) - Gasoline is going to be "bluer than blue" as of 1 October. Regular gasoline is going to be raised from 81 to 91 octane to conform to European standards and will be dyed blue. Minister of State Kazim Oksay, making the announcement, said that the new color of gasoline would not reflect on prices.

Kazim Oksay said that regular gasoline would be raised from 81 octane to 91 octane and would be dyed blue to distinguish it from super gasoline. Oksay pointed out that the change would begin on 1 October and said, "It will be applied nationwide. Regular gasoline will now be blue. Raising the octane will have many benefits, including energy conservation and as regards air pollution."

Kazim Oksay also revealed that efforts are in progress to raise the octane of super gasoline and listed as follows the advantages of 91-octane gasoline and its contributions to the economy:

"Vehicles produced in Turkey and Europe are designed for a high compression rate. So 91-octane regular gasoline will give high efficiency and performance. In this way, 3 percent-5 percent savings of fuel will be obtained throughout Turkey and we will get better mileage than with low-octane gasoline."

Minister of State Kazim Oksay said, in answer to reporters' questions at the press conference, that there would be no price hike on petroleum products in 1986, but he could not speak now for the first half of 1987.

Oksay, asked whether Iraq and Libya had caused a hitch in payment of our oil bills, replied, "It is true that Libya and Iraq are reducing their exports due to their own economic situations, but there is no drop in our exports. Our exporters have filled the void in the Middle East with export links to America and Europe."

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CSO: 3554/21

- END -